Friday, March 04, 2016

Postcapitalism

A Guide to Our Future



"Postcapitalism", subtitled "A Guide to Our Future", is the latest book by Paul Mason (@paulmasonnews). Mason is an English journalist, broadcaster, author, and visiting professor.

I must have preordered it because it just showed up on my iPad a few weeks ago. It is 378 print pages. It has an introduction and 3 parts containing 4, 3, and 3 chapters. It was a quick and compelling read, and I strongly recommend it. It seems in some ways to be the companion piece to "This Changes Everything" blogged here, approaching the same problem but from the economic rather than the environmental side.

First, a summary in very broad strokes. Human civilization has gone through 3 modes of production:

  1. Feudalism, lasting up until the start of the Enlightenment;
  2. Merchant Capitalism, from the start of the Enlightenment until the start of the Industrial Revolution;
  3. Industrial Capitalism, from the start of the Industrial Revolution until now.
Capitalism has followed 50 year Kondratiev waves, in which a new family of technologies achieves widespread deployment, leading to capital generation. The cycle winds down when the market is saturated for the new technology, at which time financial looting becomes prevalent to suck out all the nice excess capital generated, until the next technology wave comes along.

But, the 5th wave of the Industrial Capitalism era, led by "network technology, mobile communications, a truly global marketplace and information goods", has stalled. I think the reason can be described as: digital technology has broken economics. As Cory Doctorow recently put it, there are no copy-proof bits. As Mason puts it

Once you can copy/paste a paragraph, you can do it with a music track, a movie, the design of a turbofan engine and the digital mockup of the factory that will make it.

Once you can copy and paste something, it can be reproduced for free. It has, in economics-speak, a 'zero marginal cost'.

Marginal costs are what modern economic models are based on. So, no marginal costs => economics is broken. I've commented on this in the past: that "economy" implies scarcity, so how does "economics" deal with abundance?

So it is now time for a new mode of production: postcapitalism. Mason explores many aspects of what he thinks this could look like.

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The Introduction begins comparing free-market Moldova and Putin's Russia - what, an oligarchy / kleptocracy? The basic message is that both countries pretty much suck. In general, the world economy's recovery from the 2008 financial recovery has been anemic at best. and has become "a social crisis" as well.

There are, on the face of it, only two ways it can end. In the first scenario, the global elite clings on, imposing the cost of crisis on to workers, pensioners and the poor over the next ten or twenty years.

...

In the second scenario, the consensus breaks. Parties of the hard right and left come to power as ordinary people refuse to pay the price of austerity. ... This is a variant of what happened in the 1930s and there is no guarantee it cannot happen again.

The current form of Capitalism in the world is Neoliberalism. This term is used more in Europe than in the US and has nothing to do with "liberalism" - it is much more like what in the US is called Libertarianism.
Neoliberalism is the doctrine of uncontrolled markets: it says that the best route to prosperity is individuals pursuing their own self-interest, and the market is the only way to express that self-interest.

...

Its prestige rests on tangible achievements: in the past twenty-five years, neoliberalism has triggered the biggest surge in development the world has ever seen, and it unleashed an exponential improvement in core information technologies. But in the process, it has revived inequality to a state close to that of 100 years ago and has now triggered a survival-level event.

...

Among the 1 per cent, neoliberalism has the power of a religion: the more you practise it, the better you feel – and the richer you become.

But information technology is eroding neoliberalism and opening the door for postcapitalism through 3 mechanisms:
First, information technology has reduced the need for work, blurred the edges between work and free time and loosened the relationship between work and wages.

Second, information goods are corroding the market’s ability to form prices correctly. That is because markets are based on scarcity while information is abundant. ...

Third, we’re seeing the spontaneous rise of collaborative production: goods, services and organizations are appearing that no longer respond to the dictates of the market and the managerial hierarchy.

Wikipedia is the textbook case for the 3rd mechanism.

So the stage for the showdown is set:

The elite and their supporters are lined up to defend the same core principles: high finance, low wages, secrecy, militarism, intellectual property and energy based on carbon. The bad news is that they control nearly every government in the world. The good news is that in most countries they enjoy very little consent or popularity among ordinary people.

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Chapter 1 is titled "Neoliberalism Is Broken". Mason describes the 2008 financial meltdown in detail, as well as the recovery and the anti-recovery - the austerity programs many countries embarked on despite the best advice of most economists. Mason has an even harsher view of the austerity programs.

This is the real austerity project: to drive down wages and living standards in the West for decades, until they meet those of the middle class in China and India on the way up.
The 4 pillars that "first allowed neoliberalism to flourish but which have begun to destroy it" are:
  1. ‘Fiat money’, which allowed every slowdown to be met with credit loosening, and the whole developed world to live on debt.
  2. Financialization, which replaced the stagnant incomes of the developed world workforce with credit.
  3. The global imbalances, and the risks remaining in the vast debts and currency reserves of major countries.
  4. Information technology, which allowed everything else to happen, but whose future contribution to growth is in doubt.
Particularly bleak for the average person is financialization.
A single mum on benefits, forced into the world of payday loans and buying household goods on credit, can be generating a much higher profit rate for capital than an auto industry worker with a steady job.
The impact of information technology seems to be the biggest problem for Neoliberalism.
All the money created, all the velocity and momentum of finance built up during the last twenty-five years have to be set against the possibility that capitalism – a system based on markets, property ownership and exchange – cannot capture the ‘value’ generated by the new technology. In other words, it is increasingly evident that information goods conflict fundamentally with market mechanisms.
He paints a very bleak picture of the world of 2060, after 4 decades of secular stagnation. Countries may de-globalize, imposing huge tariffs on imports to stimulate local industries (as the US did in the 19th century), and go back to their own currencies to inflate away debts.

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Chapter 2 is titled "Long Waves, Short Memories". We meet Nikolai Kondratieff and learn more about his waves.

The start of a long cycle sees:
  • the rollout of new technologies
  • the rise of new business models
  • new countries dragged into the global market
  • a rise in the quantity and availability of money.
His theory has gone in and out of popularity since he first proposed it in 1925. Joseph Schumpeter's theory of Business Cycles builds on it. Shumpeter's "most prominent modern follower" is Carlota Perez.

But the theory was fatal to Kondratieff. Marxist dogma required that Capitalism come to an end, not that it keep reincarnating itself in 50 year cycles. After 8 years in prison, Kondratieff was executed by firing squad in 1938.

Here are Mason's descriptions of the 5 waves of Industrial Capitalism:

  1. 1790–1848: The first long cycle is discernible in the English, French and US data. The factory system, steam-powered machinery and canals are the basis of the new paradigm. ...
  2. 1848–mid-1890s: The second long cycle is tangible across the developed world and, by the end of it, the global economy. Railways, the telegraph, ocean-going steamers, stable currencies and machine-produced machinery set the paradigm. ...
  3. 1890s–1945: In the third cycle heavy industry, electrical engineering, the telephone, scientific management and mass production are the key technologies. ...
  4. Late-1940s–2008: In the fourth long cycle transistors, synthetic materials, mass consumer goods, factory automation, nuclear power and automatic calculation create the paradigm – producing the longest economic boom in history. ...
  5. In the late–1990s, overlapping with the end of the previous wave, the basic elements of the fifth long cycle appear. It is driven by network technology, mobile communications, a truly global marketplace and information goods. ...

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Chapter 3 is titled "Was Marx Right?". I guess I am going to have to read Marx. The 2008 crisis caused lots of people to revisit Marx.

Marxism is both a theory of history and a theory of crisis. As a theory of history it is superb: armed with an understanding of class, power and technology, we can predict the actions of powerful men before they know what they’re going to do themselves. But as a theory of crisis, Marxism is flawed.

...

Marx understood that capitalism is an unstable, fragile and complex system. He recognized that class gives different agents in the market unequal power. But Marxism underestimated capitalism’s capacity to adapt.

...

A crisis happens only when ... you run out of cheap labour, or new markets fail to appear, or the finance system can no longer safely hold all the capital that risk-averse investors are trying to store there.

Man, Marx really nails this one:
The main function of credit, he wrote, is to develop exploitation ‘to the purest and most colossal form of gambling and swindling, and to reduce more and more the number of the few who exploit the social wealth’.
I had no idea that Marxism predicted that the end of a Capitalist cycle becomes dominated by the financial sector and looting behavior. When you see vulture capitalists harvesting the infrastructure and pension funds of profitable companies and derivative of derivative financial instruments being used by the financial industry to rape and pillage, you can understand how Marxists could see this as the Capitalistic beast finally devouring itself. But they underestimate Capitalism. Other end-of-cycle behavior we've seen recently that was also widespread 100 years or 2 cycles ago:
Competition, argued the business magnates, brought chaos to production and depressed prices to the point where new technology could not be rolled out at a profit. The solutions were to be found at three levels: monopoly, price fixing and protected markets.

...

during the time we call the belle époque or the Progressive Era – a time of rapid growth, liberalization and cultural uplift – the world prospered not through the market but by the controlled suppression of it. Back then, this caused scant confusion for conservatives. The people it confused were the Marxists.

Sci-fi author David Brin, whose blog I follow, belabors this point, re conservatives and libertarians should reclaim Adam Smith and foster competition rather than monopolies. It looks like we're in the wrong part of the cycle for that.

Marx's theory was updated in the 20th century by:

  • Rudolf Hilferding was influential in the 20th century up to World War 2. He thought the evolutionary process of Capitalism would be "free markets -> monopoly -> socialism".
  • Rosa Luxemburg was also active during this period. She thought that "once the entire globe had been colonized, and capitalism introduced across the colonial world, the system must collapse." Hah, the race to the bottom will be over when the last low wage workers in the world are gone, I guess. But "Luxemburg had ignored the fact that new markets are formed in a complex way, interactively, and that they can be created not only in colonies but within national economies, local sectors, people’s homes and indeed inside their brains." Surprisingly, "by the mid-1920s, her theory had become the state doctrine of the Soviet Union."
  • Vladimir Lenin drew "the conclusion that finance-dominated capitalism was proof of the system's imminent doom. Lenin called this new declining model 'imperialism', and defined it as 'capitalism in transition'."
  • Nikolai Bukharin "asserted that, because nation states had become aligned with the interests of their dominant industrial companies, the only form of competition left was war."
  • Jeno Varga was a Hungarian Marxist economist who "predicted the constant decline of workers' real incomes." Hmmm, that sounds like the last 30 years, in the developed countries anyway.
It seems odd that these Communist political figures were on some level economists. But I guess Marxism is indeed at least as much an economic system as a political. No wonder economics remains so politicized.

Mason states his own 6 step "restatement of long-cycle theory, merged with what is rational about the Marxist understanding of crisis." Using this framework, he tells us why the 4th long cycle of the Industrial Age is different.

The fourth long cycle was prolonged, distorted and ultimately broken by factors that have not occurred before in the history of capitalism: the defeat and moral surrender of organized labour, the rise of information technology and the discovery that once an unchallenged superpower exists, it can create money out of nothing for a long time.

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Chapter 4 is titled "The Long, Disrupted Wave". Mason tells us the tale of "Les Trente Glorieuses" - the 30 years of incredible growth and prosperity that followed World War 2. The Marshall Plan rebuilt Europe, and the Bretton Woods accords established the Keynesian framework that everyone worked under. The US dollar became the world currency, its price pegged to gold, and all other currencies pegged to the dollar. The US, with its infrastructure undamaged by the war, became for 25 years the world's first true hegemonic power.

The Marshall Plan, combined with domestic rebuilding efforts, allowed most European economies to grow at well above 10 per cent per year until they reached their pre-war highpoint, which for most was achieved by 1951.
But, of course, such growth could not be sustained indefinitely, and in the early 70s, 2 shocks brought an end to this period of growth:
  1. In August, 1971, Richard Nixon took the US off of the gold standard, "thereby destroying Bretton Woods". This was in response to other nations devaluing their currencies against the dollar.
  2. In October, 1973, the Arab Oil Embargo began. The price of oil quadrupled. "The resulting shock pushed key economies into recession."
Meanwhile, workers had been doing very well during the post-war boom. But when things started to slow down, they wanted to continue with their gains. Sometimes governments helped mollify them by increasing social programs.

The stage is set for the creation of Neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism was designed and implemented by visionary politicians: Pinochet in Chile; Thatcher and her ultra-conservative circle in Britain; Reagan and the Cold Warriors who brought him to power. They’d faced massive resistance from organized labour and they’d had enough. In response, these pioneers of neoliberalism drew a conclusion that has shaped our age: that a modern economy cannot coexist with an organized working class. Consequently, they resolved to smash labour’s collective bargaining power, traditions and social cohesion completely.
We know how this turned out. Neoliberalism mostly won. In the US and UK, the power of unions was smashed.
The 1980s saw the first ‘adaptation phase’ in the history of long waves where worker resistance collapsed. ... After 1979, the workers’ failure to resist allows key capitalist countries to find a solution to the crisis through lower wages and low-value models of production.
Mason reviews economic data for the last 40-100 years a la Piketty. One interesting number is that, with the introduction of 250 million Chinese into the manufacturing workforce, from 1980 to 2000 the number of workers in the world doubled. [US workers certainly aren't happy about this, but it did enable the UN Millennial Goal for extreme poverty reduction to be met.] Chinese wages have risen to where their jobs are being being offshored to Vietnam and Bangladesh. I have lately been thinking that Africa will not be the next offshoring target because its infrastructure is so bad: limited rivers and no integrated railroads. Mason believes the data says that the "race to the bottom" is about over:
the days of easy wins for firms offshoring their production are drawing to a close.
We still finished the 4th wave with the Neoliberals firmly in control, but with Capitalism really struggling.

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Chapter 5 is titled "The Prophets of Postcapitalism" and begins Part II. The primary driver of postcapitalism is information technology, but free markets don't know how to deal with all its features.

The [2013] report showed that while ‘intangible assets’ were growing on US and UK company balance sheets at nearly three times the rate of tangible assets, the actual size of the digital sector in the GDP figures had remained static. So something is broken in the logic we use to value the most important thing in the modern economy.

...

In the 1990s, as the impact of info-tech began to be understood, people from several disciplines had the same thought at once: capitalism is becoming qualitatively different.

Buzz phrases appeared: the knowledge economy, the information society, cognitive capitalism.

Mason also uses the term "info-capitalism".

The first prophet we meet is Peter Drucker. He is considered the father of modern business management, particularly in Japan. He was all about optimizing people rather than data.

In 1993, the management guru Peter Drucker wrote: ‘That knowledge has become the resource, rather than a resource, is what makes our society “post-capitalist”. It changes, and fundamentally, the structure of society. It creates new social dynamics. It creates new economic dynamics. It creates new politics.’

...

Drucker’s case rests on the assertion that the old factors of production – land, labour and capital – have become secondary to information. In his book Post-Capitalist Society, Drucker argued that certain norms essential to capitalism were being replaced. Writing before anybody had seen an internet browser, Drucker observed the information-rich capitalism of the 1980s.

Drucker posed and answered a question crucial to understanding postcapitalism. The question: "who is the social archetype of postcapitalism?" The answer: "'the universal educated person'". And who is this "universal educated person"? Mason describes someone that sounds like millennials in general - [and The Brooklyn Hipster in particular. Know the Brooklyn Hipster by his narrow-legged black jeans, whom I have gotten to study at length when visiting my oldest daughter graphic designer who lives in ... Brooklyn!]

Mason puts his finger on my main worry re the millennials:

The problem is, they show no interest at all in overthrowing the old capitalism, and scant interest in politics at all.
The next prophet we meet is Paul Romer.
In 1990 the American economist Paul Romer blew apart one of the key assumptions of modern economics and in the process thrust the question of info-capitalism into the mainstream.

In their search for a model that could predict a country’s rate of growth, economists had listed various factors: savings, productivity, population growth. They knew that technological change influenced all these factors but they assumed, for the purposes of the model, that it was ‘exogenous’ – external to their model and therefore irrelevant to the equation they were trying to write. Then, in a paper titled Endogenous Technological Change, Romer reset the whole argument. He demonstrated that, since innovation is driven by market forces, it cannot be treated as accidental or external to economic growth but must be an intrinsic (‘endogenous’) part of it. Innovation itself has to be situated within growth theory: its impact is predictable, not random.

The impact of Romer's theory, as summarized by journalist David Warsh:
The fundamental categories of economic analysis ceased to be, as they had been for two hundred years, land, labour and capital. This most elementary classification was supplanted by people, ideas and things … the familiar principle of scarcity had been augmented by the important principle of abundance.
And the final result:
Romer’s research had shown that, once you move to an information economy, the market mechanism for setting prices will drive the marginal cost of certain goods, over time, towards zero – eroding profits in the process.

In short, information technology is corroding the normal operation of the price mechanism.

Our next prophet is one I am familiar with: Richard Stallman. He is the founder and spiritual leader of the Free & Open-Source Software (FOSS) movement. Here he is in The GNU Manifesto in 1985:
If anything deserves a reward, it is social contribution. Creativity can be a social contribution, but only in so far as society is free to use the results. Extracting money from users of a program by restricting their use of it is destructive because the restrictions reduce the amount and the ways that the program can be used. This reduces the amount of wealth that humanity derives from the program.
Contrast that to Bill Gates, who was angrily railing at people not to "steal software".

The contributions of the FOSS movement - the Linux stack, Firefox, Android, Ruby On Rails - the list goes on and on - are the 2nd textbook case for postcapitalistic production.

According to standard economics a person like Richard Stallman should not exist: he is not following his self-interest but suppressing it in favour of a collective interest that is not just economic but moral.
But information technology is not the whole story. Our next prophet is US journalist Kevin Kelly, who wrote in Wired in 1997
The grand irony of our times is that the era of computers is over. All the major consequences of stand-alone computers have already taken place. Computers have speeded up our lives a bit, and that’s it. In contrast, all the most promising technologies making their debut now are chiefly due to communication between computers that is, to connections rather than to computations.
So we now have the network economy. But, so many services are supplied on the net for free. How is a capitalist to make any money? That problem led to the dotcom crash of 2000. I love this characterization of that crash by John Perry Barlow:
‘The whole dot-com thing was an effort to use 19th and 20th century concepts of economy in an environment where they didn’t exist, and the internet essentially shrugged them off. This was an assault by an alien force that was repelled by the natural forces of the internet.’ And he pointed out where the debate might go next. ‘In the long term it’s going to be very good for the dot-communists.’
Our next prophet is Yochai Benkler, who apparently was involved in the creation of the Creative Commons License - the extension of FOSS principles to all forms of intellectual property. In his 2006 book "The Wealth of Networks" [great title, I love whenever someone invokes Adam Smith's classic]
[he] concluded that the network economy was 'a new mode of production emerging in the middle of the most advanced economies in the world’.

...

‘The result is that a good deal more that human beings value can now be done by individuals who interact with each other socially, as human beings and as social beings, rather than as market actors through the price system.’

Discussing Wikipedia and what motivates people to contribute their time to it, Mason makes what I think is an important statement:
it is not money the participants are exchanging. They are in effect exchanging gifts.
The gift economy is a known economic system mostly studied by anthropologists rather than economists. Mason doesn't use the term, I think this system might play an important part in postcapitalism.

More exploration of the information economy, and how it breaks free market capitalism.

In 1962, Kenneth Arrow, the guru of mainstream economics, said that in a free-market economy, the purpose of inventing things is to create intellectual property rights.

...

if a free-market economy with intellectual property leads to the underutilization of information, then an economy based on the full utilization of information cannot have a free market or absolute intellectual property rights. And this is just another way of saying what Benkler and Drucker understood: that info-tech undermines something fundamental about the way capitalism works.

Our next prophet really surprised me. It is none other than our old friend Karl Marx, whose better known ideas were the topic of Chapter 3. In 1858, Marx wrote a piece called "Fragment on Machines". It reminds me of Keynes "Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren", which I blogged on here - but it was written 80 years earlier, and it is quite a bit more far-thinking. In fact, it is bizarrely prescient.
Marx drops a bombshell. In an economy where machines do most of the work, where human labour is really about supervising, mending and designing the machines, the nature of the knowledge locked inside the machines must, he writes, be ‘social’

...

these two ideas – that the driving force of production is knowledge, and that knowledge stored in machines is social – led Marx to the following conclusions.

First, in a heavily mechanized capitalism, boosting productivity through better knowledge is a much more attractive source of profit than extending the working day, or speeding up labour: longer days consume more energy, speed-ups hit the limits of human dexterity and stamina. But a knowledge solution is cheap and limitless.

Second, Marx argued, knowledge-driven capitalism cannot support a price mechanism whereby the value of something is dictated by the value of the inputs needed to produce it. It is impossible to properly value inputs when they come in the form of social knowledge. Knowledge-driven production tends towards the unlimited creation of wealth, independent of the labour expended. But the normal capitalist system is based on prices determined by input costs, and assumes all inputs come in limited supply.

...

When we measure the development of technology, he writes, we are measuring the extent to which ‘general social knowledge has become a force of production … under the control of the general intellect’.

...

Furthermore, he had imagined what the main objective of the working class would be if this world ever existed: freedom from work.

But, the Capitalism of the time recovered, and Marx never went back to this idea. It lay fallow until the 1960s. The idea was first developed further by the disciples of the scholar who rediscovered 'Fragment on Machines', Antonio Negri. They called it 'cognitive capitalism'.
Cognitive capitalism, say its proponents, is a coherent new form of capitalism: a ‘third capitalism’, following the merchant capitalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the industrial capitalism of the last 200 years. It is based on global markets, financialized consumption, immaterial labour and immaterial capital.

...

Yann Moulier-Boutang, a French economist, believes that the key for cognitive capitalism is the capture of the externalities.

...

‘Capturing positive externalities,’ writes Moulier-Boutang, ‘becomes the number one problem of value.’

Externalities are side-effects, for good or for bad, possibly unintentional, of economic activity. Economics in general does not place a price on them. But, now, in cognitive capitalism, they are the thing it is crucial to measure. Traditional economics is indeed broken.

Mason disagrees with proponents of cognitive capitalism, who feel that the theory explains where we are now.

In fact, the system we live in is not a new, coherent and functioning form of capitalism. It is incoherent. Its tense, febrile and unstable character comes from the fact that we’re living in an age of the network alongside the hierarchy, the slum alongside the web café – and to understand the situation we have to see it as an incomplete transition, not a finished model.
Mason favors the description of "current reality" described by Jeremy Rifkin, in his 2014 book The Zero Marginal Cost Society.
Rifkin argues that peer-production and capitalism are two different systems; currently they coexist and even gain energy from each other, but ultimately peer-production will reduce the capitalist sector of the economy to a few niches.
Rifkin identifies the Internet of Things as having exponential growth potential.
It could rapidly reduce the marginal cost of energy and physical goods in the same way as the internet does for digital products.
So this sets the stage for the final struggle between Neoliberalism and Capitalism, and postcapitalism, succinctly described by Mason:
Technologically, we are headed for zero-price goods, unmeasurable work, an exponential takeoff in productivity and the extensive automation of physical processes. Socially, we are trapped in a world of monopolies, inefficiency, the ruins of a finance-dominated free market and a proliferation of ‘bullshit jobs’.

Today, the main contradiction in modern capitalism is between the possibility of free, abundant socially produced goods, and a system of monopolies, banks and governments struggling to maintain control over power and information. That is, everything is pervaded by a fight between network and hierarchy.

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Chapter 6 is titled "Towards the Free Machine". It begins with a description of protests in 2013 in Istanbul, where a pile of free stuff, mostly consumables, magically grew to support the protesters. It is an example of the transition from scarcity to plenty.

But it’s a major challenge for economic theory. Capitalism made us see the price mechanism as the most organic, spontaneous, granular thing in economic life. Now we need a theory of its disappearance.
The theory that Mason proposes is the labor theory of value. Although it is not popular, it dates back to Adam Smith.
‘It was not by gold or by silver but by labour that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased,’ Smith wrote; ‘and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.’
Standard economics teach that value has other components as well: capital and land. But Mason maintains that Smith felt that labor was the key component.
Profits and rents are deductions from the value produced by labour.
David Ricardo "created a more developed model". Factory owners and workers deserved to prosper, as opposed to the landed aristocracy who lived off of rents. But, as you would expect, it didn't take long for the owners and workers to disagree on how much each of their labors should be valued.
Just as a rent-seeking aristocracy can be shown to be parasites on the productive economy, so too can capitalists be seen as parasites on the work of others.
So as the labor theory of value became the bible of early trade unionists, it was increasingly rejected by the capitalists. Labor to capitalists is something to be exploited, coercively if necessary.
Even in advanced countries the labour market is built overtly on coercion. Just listen to any politician make a speech about welfare: cutting unemployment and disability benefits is designed to force people to take jobs at wages they can’t live on.

...

Work for a salary is the bedrock of the system. We accept it because, as our ancestors learned the hard way, if you don’t obey, you don’t eat.

The orthodox alternative to the labor theory of value is Marginalism, or the 'usefulness theory' of value.
Léon Walras, one of the founders of marginalism, insisted: ‘The selling prices of products are determined in the market … by reason of their utility and their quantity. There are no other conditions to consider for these are the necessary and sufficient conditions.’
Mason spends a lot of this chapter explaining why the labor theory makes more sense than Marginalism, particularly in modern times.
It treats profit as if it were made somewhere central within capitalism: the workplace, not the marketplace.

...

the labour-theory is the greatest theory of the market ever written. It ascribes to the market, and only the market, the mechanism of making concrete the reality beneath.

...

mainstream economics evolved into a pseudo-science that can only allow for statements obtained through crunching the data. The result is a neat set of textbooks, which are internally coherent but which continually fail to predict and describe reality.

...

Marginalism emerged because managers and policymakers alike needed a form of economics that was bigger than accountancy but smaller than a theory of history; it had to describe in detail the way the price system worked – and in a way that took no interest in class dynamics or social justice.

...

But there is a crucial piece of ideology built into marginalism: the assertion that the market is ‘rational’.

Hah, our old friend, 'the rational market'. As in the last economics book I reviewed, Behavioral Economics has shown 'the rational market' to be an imaginary beast.

But its inability to deal with info-capitalism in today's world is its fatal flaw.

Because marginalism was a theory of prices and prices only, it cannot comprehend a world of zero-priced goods, shared economic space, non-market organizations and non-ownable products.

But labour-theory can. The labour-theory actually predicts and calibrates its own demise.

That 2nd paragraph really threw me. "Predicts and calibrates its own demise"??? Indeed the rest of the chapter uses labor theory to develop a description of info-capitalism - to then conclude that it cannot work. I think the point is, that at least labor theory gives us a tool to evaluate info-capitalism, whereas Marginalism does not. OK, the penultimate paragraph of this chapter, quoted below, explains this.

We go back to Marx to develop this description of info-capitalism - a capitalism where, asymptotically at least, everything is free.

But the amounts of labour value embodied in information products can be negligible. And once knowledge becomes truly social – as Marx imagined with the concept of the ‘general intellect’ – some of the value is contributed for free, as follows:
  • Information goods naturally leverage general scientific knowledge
  • Their users feed back, in realtime, data that allows them to be improved, for free
  • Any improvement in knowledge somewhere can be implemented in every machine deployed everywhere, immediately.
Mason models info-capitalism, where all labor and capital costs head for zero, except for "energy and physical raw materials". So down goes marginal utility, and down goes prices. "Mainstream economics would be puzzled."
And even though we are far away from the pure information economy modeled crudely here, we can already feel these effects in reality: monopolies are arising to prevent software or information goods becoming free; accounting standards are becoming garbled as companies resort to valuation guesswork.
Even the OECD is admitting that there is trouble.
In its first major macro-economic study of the internet, in 2013, the OECD admitted: ‘While the internet’s impact on market transactions and value added has been undoubtedly far-reaching, its effect on non-market interactions … is even more profound. Non-market interactions on the internet are broadly characterised by the absence of a price and market-clearing mechanism.’
One point Mason makes is one that I have thought about, and maybe noted: that if the millennials decide to opt out of the modern economy, it will still leave the old lizards in control of raw materials.
economics in a zero production cost society quickly comes to centre on energy and raw materials: they become the sector where scarcity still rules.
I note that Mason includes energy and I do not. The decentralized nature of solar power tells me that we can get plenty of energy without involving the old lizards.

So now we come to the part where info-capitalism doesn't work.

It would have to stop the price of information goods falling, by using monopoly pricing: think Apple, Microsoft and Nikon/Canon on steroids. It would have to maximize the capture of externalities by corporations. Every interaction – between producer and consumer, consumer and consumer, friend and friend – would need to be mined for value. (In labour-theory terms, our non-work activity has to be turned into work contributed to the corporation for free.) A thriving info-capitalism might seek to maintain artificially high prices for energy and physical raw materials, through hoarding and other monopolistic behaviour, so their cost fed through into higher average necessary labour time to reproduce labour. Crucially, it would have to create new markets beyond production, in the field of services.

...

And finally, for info-capitalism to succeed it would have to find work for the millions of people whose jobs are automated.

...

But there are clear structural obstacles to making this work.

Mason lists 3 - no 4 - obstacles [Spanish Inquisition joke]. Hah, I like the shoutout to Dune and mentats. I'll include it as a tribute to Frank Herbert, the great sci-fi author and bard of evolution.

First, the normal escape route – innovation creates expensive new technologies that replace info-tech – is blocked. ... The only way you could remove the information effect from these coming technologies would be, as in Frank Herbert’s sci-fi novel Dune, to ban computers and replace them with expensive human experts in calculation.

The second obstacle is the scale of workforce redesign.

...

Alongside sex work we might have ‘affection work’: you can see the beginnings of it now in the hired girlfriend, the commercial dog-walker, the house cleaner, the gardener, the caterer and the personal concierge.

...

And here’s where you hit the third obstacle – what philosopher André Gorz called the ‘limits of economic rationality’. At a certain level, human life and interaction resist commercialization.

...

And there's yet another obstacle: property rights.

So here's the big finish:
So what we have in reality is an info-capitalism struggling to exist.

We should be going through a third industrial revolution but it has stalled.

...

An economy based on information, with its tendency to zero-cost products and weak property rights, cannot be a capitalist economy.

The usefulness of the labour-theory is that it accounts for this: it allows us to use the same metric for market and non-market production in a way that the OECD’s economists could not. Crucially it enables us to design the transition process so that we know what we are trying to achieve: a world of free machines, zero-priced basic goods and minimum necessary labour time.

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Chapter 7 is titled "Beautiful Troublemakers". It is an depth history of labor and the labor movement - although Wikipedia says that the labor movement, as opposed to socialism, was committed to working with capitalism. Particular attention is paid to the defeat of labor in the 4th wave, and the current status of labor.

Following the collapse of labor in most of the developed world, many of those manufacturing jobs have move to the 3rd world, or the "global south". Will they organize as earlier labor forces did? Mason doesn't think so.

On the subsoil of precarious work, extreme poverty, migrant labour and slum conditions it has been impossible for anything that matches the collectivity and consciousness of the Western labour movement at its height to grow in the global south.
Meanwhile, in the West, per André Gorz
Work - the defining activity of capitalism - is losing its centrality both to exploitation and resistance.
Mason is very knowledgeable on Marxist/Leninist/Communist principles - he is the most leftist writer I have encountered in my economics readings - he describes himself as having been a "Leftie activist" back in the day. I am ashamed to admit, discussion of these topics makes me cringe a little. I grew up in the US Midwest in the 1950s - maybe I'm afraid the ghost of Joe McCarthy is going to haunt my dreams or something. Looking up a lot of the youngest of the "prophets" of the prior chapter reminded me of something that I, like most Americans, think about very seldom if at all: that most if not all European countries have real live communist and socialist parties, often in several different flavors.

But as much as he respects Marxism, he is not at all shy about calling out its shortcomings. In particular, that the Wikipedia definition of "labor movement" is correct. Workers did not want to overthrow capitalism and institute socialism.

They wanted a more survivable form of capitalism.
More Marx wrongness:
Marx was wrong about the working class. He was wrong to think automation would destroy skill; wrong to say the proletariat could not produce an enduring culture within capitalism.
Mason provides great detail as the labor movement seems to progress steadily ahead from the start of the Industrial Revolution, up to World War 2. In Germany, the Nazis outlawed unions and destroyed socialist parties. Mason takes a unique view of events surrounding World War 2: the viewpoint of the labor movement.
The scale of death during the Second World War makes it difficult to comprehend. So its impact on the politics and the sociology of the working class has been the subject of a horrified silence. But let us puncture it. The majority of the Jews killed in East Europe were from politicized working-class communities. Many were adherents either of pro-Soviet, left Zionist parties or the anti-Zionist Bund. The Holocaust wiped out an entire political tradition in the global labour movement in the space of three years.

In Spain, the unions, co-ops and militias of the left were destroyed by mass murder – and their traditions suppressed until the 1970s. Meanwhile, in Russia the working-class political underground was exterminated by the gulag and mass executions.

...

As the Second World War approached, the extreme left – the Trotskyists and anarchists – tried to maintain the old, internationalist line: no support for wars between imperialist powers, keep the class struggle going at home. But by May 1940 the war was a bigger fact than the class struggle.

...

Working-class politics would become dependent on an Allied military victory. After the war, those who survived the slaughter, conscious of how close organized labour had come to total obliteration, now sought a strategic accommodation.

After the war, in "Les Trente Glorieuses", labor was relatively well treated. Piketty pointed out that during the war there were rigid wage controls imposed on managers and executives - maybe that and the "one-for-all" attitude of the war made capitalism a little less rapacious for a while.

Hah, this is something I had never heard, but it makes sense:

Additionally, the Allies actually imposed welfare states, trade union rights and democratic constitutions on Italy, Germany and Japan, as a punishment for their elites and as an obstacle to their re-emergence as fascist powers.
It seems really sad that you can look at "Les Trente Glorieuses" as Capitalism playing rope-a-dope with labor and lulling it into complacency - and then reorganizing as Neoliberalism for the knockout punch.
The trade-off? Workers abandoned the ideologies of resistance that had sustained them in the third long wave.
Increasing automation post-war foreshadowed where we are now.
If work seemed ‘absurd, ridiculous and boring’ to the Fiat workers Alquati interviewed in the early 1960s, there was a deeper reason. ... There would come a time when manual work was no longer necessary.
Moving into the 1970s, the contraceptive pill greatly changed the labor force.
Women surged into higher education: for example, 10 per cent of US law students in 1970 were female – this rose to 30 per cent ten years later. And with control over the timing of childbirth, the stage was set for a decisive increase in female participation in the workforce.

In sum, what emerged was a new kind of worker. The generation that would wage class war in the 1970s began with higher incomes, higher levels of personal freedom, fragmenting social ties and much better access to information.

Again, we come to 1980, when the Neoliberal onslaught began. Led by stagflation and the recessions and increased public spending it caused, together with increasing worker frustration and activism,
a new breed of conservative politicians decided the entire system would have to be dismantled. The second oil shock, after the Iranian revolution in 1979, gave them the opportunity. It triggered a new, deep recession and this time the workers faced corporations and politicians determined to try something new: mass unemployment, industrial closures, wage cuts and cuts in public spending.

They also faced the emergence of something they’d insufficiently prepared for in the years of radicalism: a part of the workforce prepared to side with conservative politicians. White southern workers put Reagan into power; many skilled British workers, tired of the chaos, swung to the Conservatives in 1979 to give Thatcher ten years in office. Outright working-class conservatism had never gone away: what it always wants is order and prosperity, and by 1979 it could no longer see these things being delivered by the Keynesian model.

By the mid-1980s, the working class of the developed world had moved in the space of fifteen years from passivity to strikes and semi-revolutionary struggles to strategic defeat.

That brings us to our modern, international, service-oriented workforce. I had not realized that financialization was as bad as it is. It seems like such a sad thing. And indeed it has effects.
Costas Lapavitsas, a professor of economics at London University’s SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), calls this ‘financial expropriation’, and its impact on the self-image of the working class has been profound.
Most modern information workers are playing against a stacked deck as well. When I went on vacation, my coworkers knew I expected them to handle my work, and I was actually never disturbed on vacation. How many modern information workers get away with that now?
In highly information-centred work, especially with smart mobile devices, work and leisure time are substantially blurred. This has over a relatively short period loosened the bond between wages and working time.

...

The worker of the Keynesian era had a single character: at work, in the local bar, in the social club, on the football terraces, they were the same essential person. The networked individual creates a more complex reality: s/he lives parallel lives at work, in numerous fragmentary subcultures and online.

...

All the qualities the sociologists of the 1990s observed in the tech workforce – mercuriality, spontaneous networking, multiple selves, weak ties, detachment, apparent subservience concealing violent resentment – have become the defining qualities of being a young, economically active human being.

But the same network that ties modern workers to their jobs 24x7 also ties them together - so, bosses beware!
China’s workers – who for now look like digital rebels but analog slaves – are at the heart of the phenomenon of networked rebellion. These networked movements are evidence that a new historical subject exists. It is not just the working class in a different guise; it is networked humanity.

...

They [networked individuals] are the working class ‘sublated’ – improved upon and replaced. They may be as clueless as to strategy as the workers of the early nineteenth century were, but they are no longer in thrall to the system. They are enormously dissatisfied with it.

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Chapter 8 is titled "On Transitions" and begins Part III. Great starting quote:

An all-round increase in wealth threatened the destruction – indeed in some sense was the destruction – of a hierarchical society.
Emmanuel Goldstein, in George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four
Hmmm, looking forward, I don't know if Mason gives enough credit to the power of the lizard brain - the source of hierarchical behavior in everything with a backbone. The old lizards are tough.

Humanity has seen so far 1 major transition in mode of production: from feudalism to capitalism, beginning at around the time of The Enlightenment. So studying that transition might help us understand what the transition from capitalism to whatever-comes-next might look like.

[BTW, 'postcapitalism' is a horrible name for 'whatever-comes-next' - clearly no marketing people have been involved in the naming. Seriously, I really think this bears some thought. Names are important. Look at when Dennett and some of them came up with the name "Brights" for atheists. Ugh. Commonwealthism? Plentyism? Abundancy?]

Mason gives us another science fiction reference: Red Star (1909) by Alexander Bogdanov. Bogdanov, a medical doctor, was one of the twenty-two founder members of Bolshevism. Mars is used as a stand-in for a future where automation has eliminated all work.

Bogdanov was using the novel to outline a complete alternative to the ideas that would dominate the far left in the twentieth century. He advocates technological maturity as the precondition for revolution, the peaceful overthrow of the capitalists by means of compromise and compensation, a focus on technology as a means to reduce labour to a minimum and a relentless insistence that it is humanity itself that has to be transformed, not just the economy. Furthermore, a major theme of Red Star is that postcapitalist society has to be sustainable for the planet.
This is quite a different vision for Russia.
There is a whole literature of 'what if?' focused on Bogdanov - and rightly so.
So rather than putting Russia on a road to postcapitalism, Lenin and even worse Stalin created a Russia that just didn't work. We are going to look at their failed transition to see if we can gain any insight into our stalled transition to postcapitalism. The worst of their ideas was a planned economy.

The 1920s and 1930s featured "The Calculation Debate" - can you calculate well enough to plan an economy? In 1920, Ludwig von Mises published "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth". He posited that, divorced from reality, a planning system will never calculate what is needed as well as a market.

In the 1930s, one of Mises's pupils, Friedrich Hayek, another Libertarian favorite, retreated from this, and said, with "the right information", calculation could be done - but too slowly.

Polish economist Oskar Lange kind of went with a hybrid plan: consumer markets with central planning.

Instead of being signalled through price movements, the unmet needs of the economy are signalled through shortages and surplus goods.
It took me a while to understand why we care about "the calculation debate". The reason is, if the price of everything goes to zero and markets are broken, how is supply matched to demand? This brings us back to needing the labor theory of value.
Mises’s work on calculation contains a second valuable insight: it is not trading between enterprises that is the true mediator of supply and demand in a market economy, it is the finance system – which puts a price on capital. ... if we want a postcapitalist economy, not only do we need something better than the market for distributing goods, we also need something better than the finance system for allocating capital.
Something else learned from the failure of the planned Russian economy:
In economic terms, the most important thing the Russian Trotskyists left us was probably the idea that a transition phase generates its own dynamics; it is never just the fading of one system and the rise of another.
Some more from Trotsky:
In a memorable passage, whose relevance to the twenty-first century will be clear, Trotsky wrote:
If a universal mind existed … that could register simultaneously all the processes of nature and society, that could measure the dynamics of their motion, that could forecast the results of their inter-reactions – such a mind, of course, could a priori draw up a faultless and exhaustive economic plan, beginning with the number of acres of wheat down to the last button for a vest.
The absence of such a ‘universal mind’, he said, requires instead the promotion of workers’ democracy – which had been abolished. Only if human beings, with freedom of speech, became the sensors and feedback mechanisms for the planning system could this crude calculating machine work.
We now move forward 60 years or so. We have powerful computers now! Let's revisit the "the calculation debate"! But, spoiler alert, it still doesn't work.
Over the past twenty years, Paul Cockshott and Allin Cottrell – a computer scientist and an economics professor – have worked tirelessly on a problem we thought we didn’t have: how to plan an economy. Though not well known, their work is rigorous and performs an invaluable service; it is a textbook outline of what we should not do.

...

Though the researchers decry the dogmatic idiocy of Soviet planning, their world view remains that of a hierarchical society, of physical products, of a simple system where the pace of change is slow. The model they’ve produced is the best demonstration yet of why any attempt to use state planning and market suppression as a route to postcapitalism is closed.

On to the transition from feudalism to capitalism at the time of The Enlightment.
The mode of production is one of the most powerful ideas to come out of Marxist economics.
Mason does something I thought was really interesting. He looks to the plays of Shakespeare. In particular, the history plays represent the old mode of production, the tragedies and comedies the new.
Feudalism was a system based on obligation: ... peasants ... to the landowner ... to ... the king

...

In the comedies and tragedies we are suddenly in a world of bankers, merchants, companies, mercenary soldiers and republics. ... The typical hero is a person whose greatness is essentially bourgeois and self-made

From Shakespeare back to Marx.
For Marx, a mode of production describes a set of economic relationships, laws and social traditions that form the underlying ‘normal’ of a society. ... To understand a mode of production, another revealing question is: ‘what reproduces itself spontaneously?’ In feudalism, it is the concept of fealty and obligation; in capitalism, it is the market.
So Marx believed that communism would occur after capitalism, to share the abundance capitalism has created? We get a quote from the 1930 Keynes that I mentioned earlier.
'there must come a time when there is relative abundance, compared to the scarcity that has driven all previous economic models', then Marx was only saying the same thing as Keynes said in the early 1930s: one day there will be enough goods to go around and the economic problem will be solved. 'For the first time since his creation,' Keynes wrote, 'man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem - how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares ... to live wisely and agreeably and well.'
If you doubt a future of abundance, this chart should make a believer of you. It's actually kind of scary. More pretty charts in addition to this one here.

as the graph above shows, GDP per person rates are rising all across the world. The stage where all the lines go close to vertical is the one Keynes and Marx allowed themselves to imagine – and so should we.
We have reached the "four probable causes for the end of feudalism."
  1. The Black Death. 1/4 of Europe's people gone.
    Suddenly farm workers, who had been the lowest of the low, could command higher wages.

    ...

    'Agricultural rents collapsed after the Black Death and wages in the towns soared to two and even three times the levels they had held'

    ...


  2. The second driver of change was the growth of banking.

    ...


  3. The third big driver of capitalism's takeoff was the conquest and pillage of the Americas

    ...


  4. Finally, there was the printing press.
...

If we accept the four-factor account given above, the dissolution of feudalism is not primarily a technology story. It is a complex interplay between failing economics and outside shocks.

So now let's see how this compares to where we are at now, the end of capitalism.
feudalism was an economic system structured by customs and laws about obligation. Capitalism was structured by something purely economic: the market. We can predict from this that postcapitalism – whose precondition is abundance – will not simply be a modified form of a complex market society.

...

The modern equivalent of the long stagnation of late feudalism is the stalled fifth Kondratieff cycle, where instead of rapidly automating work out of existence, we are reduced to creating bullshit jobs on low pay, and many economies are stagnating.

Are there now shocks to capitalism similar to the 4 described shocks to feudalism described above? Yes.
The modern-day external shocks are clear: energy depletion, climate change, ageing populations and migration. They are altering the dynamics of capitalism and making it unworkable in the long term.
What will the transition out of capitalism look like?
a gradual, iterative and modular project. Its aim should be to expand those technologies, business models and behaviours that dissolve market forces, eradicate the need for work and progress the world economy towards abundance.

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Chapter 9 is titled "The Rational Case for Panic". This chapter is where we sync up with "This Changes Everything".

Wherever I go, I ask questions about economics - and get answers about climate.

...

In this book, I’ve avoided ‘building in’ the climate crisis until now. I wanted to show how the clash between info-tech and market structures is, on its own, driving us towards an important turning point. Even if the ecosphere was in a steady state, our technology would still be pushing us beyond capitalism.

In case you were wondering: CLIMATE CHANGE IS REAL! THE CLIMATE CRISIS IS REAL!
in the edge-places of the world the catastrophe is happening already. If we listened to those whose lives are being destroyed by floods, deforestation and encroaching deserts, we would better understand what is coming: the total disruption of the world.
Mason states the thing that absolutely blew me away as I started reading "This Changes Everything": how is possible for climate deniers to deny, in the face of overwhelming evidence opposing their case?
It has become common to laugh at the absurdities of the climate-change deniers, but there is a rationality to their response. They know that climate science destroys their authority, their power and their economic world. In a way, they have grasped that if climate change is real, capitalism is finished.
Mason reviews the severity of the climate crisis, and additionally the (aging) population bomb. Japan is the canary-in-the-coal-mine for the effects of an aging population. Pension funds across the world are having trouble. The summary:
The psychological byproduct in the minds of the policy elite was the idea that there are no impossible situations; there are always choices, even if some of them turn out to be tough ones. There is always a solution, and it is usually the market.

But these external shocks should be the alarm call. Climate change does not present us with a choice of market or non-market routes to meeting carbon targets. It mandates either the orderly replacement of market economics or its disorderly collapse in abrupt phases. Ageing populations run the risk of tanking the world’s financial markets, and some countries will have to wage a social war on their own citizens just to stay solvent. If that happens it will make what happened in Greece after 2010 look like just a few bad summers.

...

If you used the method engineers use – root cause analysis – to ask why three systemic disruptions are happening at once (financial, climatic and demographic), you would quickly trace them to their cause: an economic system in disequilibrium with its environment and insufficient to satisfy the needs of a rapidly changing humanity.

The chapter concludes with a call to action, with a bit of an attempt to inject some pragmatism into the often feckless left:
So we need to inject into the environment and social justice movements things that have for twenty-five years seemed the sole property of the right: willpower, confidence and design.

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Chapter 10 is titled "Project Zero". This is the final chapter, it is time for The Plan [Dune movie reference].

a new route beyond capitalism has opened up, based on promoting and nurturing non-market production and exchange, and driven by information technology.

...

I call it Project Zero – because its aims are a zero-carbon energy system; the production of machines, products and services with zero marginal costs; and the reduction of necessary labour time as close as possible to zero.

Mason now spells out "FIVE PRINCIPLES OF TRANSITION":
The first principle is to understand the limitations of human willpower in the face of a complex and fragile system.

...

The second principle for designing the transition is ecological sustainability.

...

The third principle I want to insist on is: the transition is not just about economics.

...

A fourth principle should be: attack the problem from all angles.

...

The fifth principle for a successful transition is that we should maximize the power of information.

...

we should use the new breed of simulation tools to model every proposal virtually before we enact it for real.

So those are the principles. Now let's get the goals.
  1. Rapidly reduce carbon emissions so that the world has warmed by only two degrees Celsius by 2050, prevent an energy crisis and mitigate the chaos caused by climate events.
  2. Stabilize the finance system between now and 2050 by socializing it, so that ageing populations, climate change and the debt overhang do not combine to detonate a new boom-bust cycle and destroy the world economy.
  3. Deliver high levels of material prosperity and wellbeing to the majority of people, primarily by prioritizing information-rich technologies towards solving major social challenges, such as ill health, welfare dependency, sexual exploitation and poor education.
  4. Gear technology towards the reduction of necessary work to promote the rapid transition towards an automated economy. Eventually, work becomes voluntary, basic commodities and public services are free, and economic management becomes primarily an issue of energy and resources, not capital and labour.
For the rest of this chapter, Mason talks about us digging in, getting our hands dirty, and making it happen. Some of these are "yeah, right", but Mason often has a snappy comeback which leaves you saying, "yeah, well, OK, maybe".
First, we need an open, accurate and comprehensive computer simulation of current economic reality.

...

So one of the most radical – and necessary – measures we could take is to create a global institute or network for simulating the long-term transition beyond capitalism.

Mason astutely points out that the E in DSGE, which are the models popular in economics now, stands for "Equilibrium" - and there's not likely to be much of that around when we are transitioning between modes of production.

Another no-brainer for starting down the right path:

switch off the neoliberal privatization machine. ... the neoliberal system cannot exist without constant, active intervention by the state to promote marketization, privatization and the interests of finance. It typically deregulates finance, forces government to outsource services and allows public healthcare, education and transport to become shoddy, driving people to private services.
As I have said before, "privatization" always means figuring out how to line some fat cat's pockets.

More help for the fat cat's in today's world:

even the most progressive infrastructure designs are molded around the interests of the rich ... infrastructure planning remains one of the disciplines least transformed by networked thinking.
My reaction to this next part is definitely, "good luck with that":
It would be more sensible to combine controlled debt write-offs with a ten- to fifteen-year global policy of ‘financial repression’: that is, to stimulate inflation, hold interest rates lower than the inflation rate, remove people’s ability to move money into non-financial investments or offshore, and thus inflate away the debts, writing off the part that remained.

To be brutally clear, this would reduce the value of assets in pension funds, and thus the material wealth of the middle classes and the old; and by imposing capital controls you would be partially deglobalizing finance. But this is only a controlled way of doing what the market will do via chaos if, as S&P predicts, 60 per cent of all countries see their debt reduced to junk by 2050.

I don't know. This also made me think about a word that gives me a feeling of happiness and hope whenever I see it: jubilee!

In the section "EXPAND COLLABORATIVE WORK", Mason discusses coops, which have always seemed like a good way forward to me. Their problem is that, unless they team up with a bank, they usually have limited capital. It reminds me of the hardship that successful slave rebellions on Caribbean islands - say Haiti and northern Barbados - encountered. The slaves got their freedom, the capitalists withdrew all capital, and these are still the poorest areas in the region. Coops represent successful wage slave revolts.

The classic workers’ co-ops always failed because they had no access to capital and when crisis hit they couldn’t persuade their members to take lower wages or work fewer hours. Successful modern co-ops, such as Mondragon in Spain, work because they have the support of local savings banks and because they’re complex structures

...

In a network-based transition, collaborative business models are the most important thing we an foster.

...

Likewise we should not fetishize the non-profit aspect of things.

[The Mondragon coop features prominently as a role model in Kim Stanley Robinson's "2312", blogged here, which is I think is a post-scarcity sci-fi novel worthy of comparison to the gold standard, the Iain M. Banks Culture novels.]

This next thing is a great idea. I think I will create a petition at whitehouse.gov for this. It sounds like something Obama might enjoy setting up during this, the "no-fucks-to-give", segment of his presidency.

At the government level, there could be an Office of the Non-Market Economy.
Are the corporations going to help? For the most part, probably only if forced to via "law and regulation". So political power will still be required.
The low-wage, low-skill and low-quality corporations that have flourished since the 1990s exist only because the space for them was ruthlessly carved out by the state. All we need to do is throw that process into reverse gear.

It may sound radical to outlaw certain business models, but that’s what happened with slavery and with child labour.

That last statement is a great and insightful point.

What form will the resistance of Capitalism to its demise take?

The creation of monopolies to resist prices falling towards zero is capitalism’s most important defence reflex against postcapitalism.
Infrastructure companies are some of the biggest monopolies Capitalism currently has going for it. These should definitely be brought back under public control.
In summary: under a government that embraced postcapitalism, the state, the corporate sector and public corporations could be made to pursue radically different ends with relatively low-cost changes to regulation, underpinned by a radical programme to shrink debt.
We've seen that this transition is being brought about by the fact that economics is broken and markets are failing. What do we do about markets?
There is no reason to abolish markets by diktat, as long as you abolish the basic power imbalances that the term ‘free market’ disguises.

Once firms are forbidden to set monopoly prices, and a universal basic income is available (see below), the market is actually the transmitter of the ‘zero marginal cost’ effect, which manifests as falling labour time across society.

But in order to control the transition, we would need to send clear signals to the private sector, one of the most important of which is this: profit derives from entrepreneurship, not rent.

Not real sure about this next. Are we rewarding entrepreneurship or not? But, if we really want more people to use Creative Commons licenses, we could do this, and figure that most creators do it from the love of creation, not money. I guess the 2nd paragraph explains it as well.
But patents and intellectual property would be designed to taper away quickly.

...

as befits a society where the rate of innovation is becoming exponential, the reward period is going to be shorter.

This next one is going to go over really well with 'small government' proponents. But, I have seen where 1/3 of fossil fuel corporations are facing bankruptcy. What would that number be if their tax and other incentives were removed? So maybe government picks these companies up for a song.
To meet climate change with urgent action, the state should take ownership and control of the energy distribution grid, plus all big carbon-based suppliers of energy. These corporations are already toast, as the majority of their reserves cannot be burned without destroying the planet. To incentivize capital investment in renewables, this technology would be subsidized and the companies providing it remain outside state ownership where possible.
And if that weren't enough, let's "SOCIALIZE THE FINANCE SYSTEM" as well. Really, really, good luck with this?

But, we almost did some of this in 2008; we almost did buyouts instead of bailouts. And the plan to put banks in Post Offices seems doable - I believe Canada is moving ahead with this - and a great 1st step. Here is a very reasonable justification for socialization, in view of the 2008 bailouts:

Morally, if the risks are socialized, then the rewards should be socialized too.
Here are the steps towards this socialization:
  1. Nationalize the central bank, setting it an explicit target for sustainable growth and an inflation target on the high side of the recent average.

    ...

    In addition to its classic functions – monetary policy and financial stability – a central bank should have a sustainability target

    The US is already there, yes? The Fed is nationalized. In contrast, I believe that the Bank of England is the de facto but NOT the official national bank.

  2. Restructure the banking system into a mixture of utilities earning capped profit rates; non-profit local and regional banks; credit unions and peer-to-peer lenders; and a comprehensive state-owned provider of financial services.
  3. Leave a well-regulated space for complex financial activities. ... The guiding principles would be to reward innovation and to penalize and discourage rent-seeking behaviour.

    ...

    In countries such as the UK, Singapore, Switzerland and the USA with globally oriented finance sectors, governments could offer a deal whereby, in return for coming clearly and transparently onshore, some limited lender of last resort facilities were made available to the remaining high-risk, profit-oriented finance firms. Those which did not come onshore and become transparent would be treated as the financial equivalent of Al-Qaeda.

The proposal to socialize/nationalize the finance system really kind of gobsmacked me. But once you think about it, it makes so much sense. I have concluded that there are some business activities that should always be not-for-profit: healthcare, prisons, war. Putting a profit motive into any of these immediately creates immense moral peril.

Meanwhile, the finance system is charged with administering the most pervasive piece of software in our current system: money. When you see day traders, high-frequency traders, creators of advanced derivative financial instruments acting as parasites on our financial system and extracting mass quantities of $$$ while adding absolutely no value, you know there is a problem. These guys are basically financial hackers exploiting bugs in the system.

I think at one point I proposed, tax these guys profits 50% - if they are going go be parasites on the rest of our financial dealings, they should at least split the loot 50-50. So maybe, socializing the market is a more direct approach to the problem?

Here is a beautiful idea of a forward-looking financial system:

In future we might see all kinds of socially benign instruments traded – health outcomes, for example. If the state can create a market in carbon, it can create a market in anything else. It can use market forces for behaviour change, but ultimately there must come a time when it imbues these instruments – which effectively form a parallel currency – with greater purchasing power than actual money.
I like this next too, it is a balanced approach: wherever there is not moral or environmental peril, allow a competitive marketplace.
With energy and banking socialized, the aim in the medium term would be to retain as extensive as possible a private sector in the non-financial world, and to keep it open to a diverse and innovative range of firms.

Neoliberalism, with its high tolerance for monopolies, has actually stifled innovation and complexity.

And finally, we come to one of my latest causes. It is very sad, that Universal Basic Income (UBI) should be the #1 target for progressives, except that, in the US, we don't even have Universal Health Care! I have been backing UBI advocate Scott Santens (@2noname) on Patreon for several months now.
the biggest structural change required to make postcapitalism happen: a universal basic income guaranteed by the state.

...

A basic income paid for out of taxes on the market economy gives people the chance to build positions in the non-market economy.

...

The universal basic income, then, is an antidote to what the anthropologist David Graeber calls ‘bullshit jobs’: the low-paid service jobs capitalism has managed to create over the past twenty-five years that pay little, demean the worker and probably don’t need to exist.

We're whipping and driving down the stretch now! Almost there!
the global corporations get their market power from knowing more – more than their customers, suppliers and small competitors. The simple principle behind postcapitalism should be that the pursuit of information asymmetry is wrong – except when it comes to privacy, anonymity and security issues.

...

cooperative, self-managed, non-hierarchical teams are the most technologically advanced form of work. Yet large parts of the workforce are trapped in a world of fines, discipline, violence and power hierarchies – simply because the existence of a cheap labour culture allows it to survive.

YES! YES! YES! Embrace Utopia!
We need to be unashamed utopians. The most effective entrepreneurs of early capitalism were exactly that, and so were all the pioneers of human liberation.
Thinking about how hard making this transition could be, this is a very astute and hopeful observation:
It is absurd that we are capable of witnessing a 40,000-year-old system of gender oppression begin to dissolve before our eyes and yet still seeing the abolition of a 200-year-old economic system as an unrealistic utopia.
The penultimate point: "LIBERATE THE 1 PER CENT". I think I've blogged about how closely CEO psych profiles match those of psychopaths. And several recent research studies show the ultra-rich do indeed tend to be entitled dickheads. Ha ha, nice that Mason shows sympathy for the assholes:
Beneath it all lies lingering doubt. Their self-belief tells them that capitalism is good because it is dynamic – but its dynamism is only really felt where there are plentiful supplies of cheap labour, repressed democracy – and where inequality is rising. To live in a world so separate, dominated by the myth of uniqueness but in reality so uniform, constantly worried you’re going to lose it all, is – I am not kidding – tough.

And to cap it all, they know how close it came to collapsing; how much of every single thing they still own was actually paid for by the state, which bailed them out.

A quick look at the dark/down side:
The danger is that as the crisis drags on the elite's commitment to liberalism evaporates.

...

'China shows capitalism works better without democracy'

Phew, we did it! We're there. And thank you, Paul Mason, for your final uplifting message:
But there is good news.

The 99 per cent are coming to the rescue.

Postcapitalism will set you free.

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As I said at the beginning, a compelling read, a strong narrative. My ignorance of leftist economics is made apparent, but informed somewhat as well. This was the book I totally needed to read next. I like The Plan - lots of ideas, lots of entry points.

But as I noted, parts of The Plan clearly require political muscle, which brings us back to the question of our times: are the Millennials ever going to start voting?

I've mentioned before my fear that they will rather just opt-out on existing political institutions, like in the eye-opening story by Karl Schroeder in the "Hieroglyph" collection which I blogged about here. It seems like that has so much chance of failure - but, my oldest daughter was active in Occupy Sandy, where hastily-organized volunteers with hastily-constructed web apps were able to seriously outperform the Red Cross, particularly in low-income areas - so maybe it does have a chance of success.

One nitpick: Mason at times talks about the 4th cycle being prolonged, and other times about the 5th cycle being stalled. I think the "5th cycle is stalled" fits the 50 year cycle model better. Ha ha, one thing about doing these in-depth reviews, you notice that type of thing.

One thing I don't quite get: Mason seems to dislike 'fiat money' and "creating money out of nothing". I'm not sure why, except for the fact that it is part of what makes Neoliberalism work. Seems to me like we need to do more of it. Money is just software after all. A tool that has been misused should not be thrown away, but rather used properly.

I also felt that Mason tended to let the narrative of the labor movement overwhelm other viewpoints. That seems to be his area of greatest expertise, so that is understandable. It was very interesting at times - say in the discussion in Chapter 7 about World War 2. But in that same chapter, in discussing the betrayal of workers in voting for Reagan and Thatcher, he totally ignores other factors that I would say were also of great importance: racism, religious fundamentalism, and patriarchalism rejecting the civil rights movement, the 60s-70s counterculture, and the new freedom contraception brought to women, for example.

Similarly Mason seemed incredibly informed on the history of Marxism/Leninism, the Bolsheviks, and Russian communism. I learned lots of stuff on these topics, on which I had heretofore been pretty ignorant, but at times I really didn't feel that they added much to the main narrative. I guess the reason for including them was seeing some of why capitalism's only recent competitor failed, and why it could not serve as a postcapitalist solution. But my lack of interest here probably derives in a large part from the US/Neocon narrative that "Communism lost, so it is bullshit."

Still, I was quite surprised at the number and depth of Marx's insights. So, despite Krugman's recently recommending against it, it looks like "Capital" is going on the reading list.


One thing that tickled me as I was writing this review/summary. Mason talked about copy/pasting from sources into his book. Normally I am working on a PC, to which I download the ePub of the book from Kobo. I then use Adobe Digital Editions to copy excerpts into blogspot in my browser. But I didn't have access to my PC, only to my MacBook. No Adobe Digital Editions on the MacBook - I guess Apple and Adobe are still feuding. At the advice of Kobo support, I installed Kobo Desktop on the MacBook, so I can now pull the eBook up. Oops, you can select, but there is no copy function. So here is my fabulous kludge: you select the text; click Translate from the dropdown menu; when it balks, click LOOK UP ON Wikipedia; when Wikipedia pops up in the Browser, command-A, command-C from its input box, and the text is now in the cut/paste buffer, ready for blogspot. Tada! Information does indeed want to be free!


One final note, "SEARCH THIS BLOG" had never seemed to work well on this blog. I view this blog as my exocortex, so limited search capability is definitely a time-wasting bummer. It seems to be working much better now! Thank you, Oh Google!

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Tuesday, February 16, 2016

Medusa's Web

Okay, I lied. I said I was going to read a worthwhile book. But, my concentration was off due to some medical-foo going on, so I decided on more escapism.

I read Tim Powers' latest "Medusa's Web". Powers has made a living with stories involving odd forms of magic and mysticism and famous historical figures. This time the magic is "spiders": 8-legged mandalas that cause odd effects, including time travel and body jumping. The famous historical figures are Hollywood silent movie figures, including Rudolph Valentino.

The main characters are flawed "normal" people. They kind of reminded of the characters in my favorite Powers: "Last Call", which is a Fisher King story with Bugsy Siegel and other figures from the the founding of Las Vegas.

I've always enjoyed these stories. They are page-turners. But it's starting to seem a little like he's got a machine cranking them out. Still, an enjoyable read.

I also read "The Vital Abyss", by James S. A. Corey. This is a novella that provides more backstory in the world of The Expanse. I've watched the 1st season of the The Expanse on SyFy and I think it has been very good. It's nice to watch something that has an intricate yet logical plot that takes its time developing.

Friday, February 05, 2016

Music (Byrd Song)

A little over 2 months since I last did this.
  • Joanna Newsom, "Divers". Very similar to her last one which I talked about 2 months ago. Funny, still no song even close to being as strong as the one my daughter pointed me at - "Good Intentions Paving Co.". 3 stars
  • Grieg: Peer Gynt Suite #1 & #2 (1876), Piano Concerto in A Minor (1868). I put my Halloween playlist of scary classical music on while I was giving out candy. I noticed I was missing "On October 31 ..." I figured out this was "In the Hall of the Mountain King" by Grieg, the 4th piece of Peer Gynt Suite #1.

    The album also came with the Piano Concerto in A Minor, with which I was very familiar. I think I was introduced to this in college by my friend Charles G. St. Pierre, aka "The Saint" and "Greg". In a piece of synchronicity, I've had some correspondence with Charlie via this blog, and determined that I had started following his economics blog a few months ago. 4 stars for the Grieg.


  • Jim White vs. The Packway Handle Band, "Take It Like A Man". More modern folk than some of Jim White's other stuff. Very reminiscent of Old Crow Medicine Show say. Still some of his witty lyrics, say on "Gravity Won't Fail" or "Paranormal Girlfriend". 3 stars.
  • ELO, "Jeff Lynne's ELO - Alone in the Universe". The Electric Light Orchestra is back! Decent material but nothing to match my favs from the old days like "Mr. Blue Sky" or "Nightrider". 3 stars.
  • Adele, "25". Adele seems so genuine - not manufactured by the recording industry. This album has been an unbelievable smash, weeks and weeks at #1. I don't like it as well as her 1st 2. I think part of the reason for her success is the way she belts out these songs makes them very popular for other people to belt out, particularly in singing competitions. But, I don't know, I'm getting kind of tired of it. 3 stars.
  • Dirty Projectors, "Bitte Orca" (2009). I continue to work backwards collecting this band's music. This one is much more experimental. The sound has not gelled as in the later ones. I'll still go with 4 stars for it. Here's "Two Doves", with one of the females singing lead.


  • Deerhoof, "La Isla Bonita", 2014. These guys are as Japanese, quirky, and energetic as ever. 4 stars. Here's "Mirror Monster".


  • Coldplay, "A Head Full Of Dreams". Very laid back and easy to listen to. It's hard to imagine they are the Superbowl halftime show this year. 3 stars.
  • Charlie Byrd, "Sketches of Brazil, Music of Villa-Lobos" (1967). Ripped from vinyl. Very nice classical guitar etudes and preludes. Prelude #2 is very familiar to me. I think I must have practiced it back when I was taking classical guitar lessons (mid-60s), but the skill level sure seems beyond mine. 3 stars.


  • The Byrds, "Mr. Tambourine Man" (1965), "Turn, Turn, Turn" (1965), "Fifth Dimension" (1966), and "Younger Than Yesterday" (1967). #1, #3, and #4 ripped from vinyl. Finally! I was really looking forward to these, and they did not disappoint. I was 14-16 when these came out, and they were among my total favorites at the time. And when your hormones are 1st kicking in is when the music really burns itself in.

    The Byrds were known for creating folk rock and later country rock; covering Dylan songs; 12 string electric guitar played by Roger (originally Jim) McGuinn; and great 2 and 3 part vocal harmony. I found that my favorite songs were the ones written by Gene Clark, who left the band after the 2nd album due to a fear of flying, and who died in 1991 at age 46 after a life of substance abuse. The David Crosby written songs are the best after that. The history of the band, as per the wikipedia page is really interesting.

    After these 4 albums, David Crosby and bass player and vocalist Chris Hillman both left the band, leaving McGuinn as the only founding member. Graham Parsons was with them for a while and led them to a more country sound, but fabulous session guitarist Clarence White, who can be heard on some of the tracks of the 4th album, joined and I think really defined their sound thereafter. I saw that lineup in Boston in 1972. Per Wikipedia, Clarence White was born Clarence LeBlanc and was from Maine - so, French-Canadian stock. And, sadly, which I never knew, he was struck by a car while unloading equipment from a truck and killed in 1973, after which the band disbanded.

    So, 4 stars for everything except 2 stars for "Captain Soul" from the 3rd album - you just can't play blues licks on a 12-string electric - and several new 5 star songs, yay!

    The song I liked best of all I would not have gotten if I had had the vinyl. "She Don't Care About Time" was the B-side of the "Turn, Turn, Turn" single and never made it onto a vinyl album. They included it when the album was remastered in 1996. A Gene Clark song, with some ripped-off Bach melodies.

    From the 1st album, "Here Without You", another Gene Clark song.

    From the 2nd album, "Wait and See", a David Crosby song.

    Another Gene Clark song, "The World Turns All Around Her".

    Getting psychedelic on the 3rd album, which featured "Eight Miles High", "I See You", by Crosby and McGuinn.

    Finally, from the 4th album, "Have You Seen Her Face", by Chris Hillman. A little cheesy, I don't care, I like it.


  • Buddy Emmons and others, "Suite Steel", 1970. Ripped from vinyl. A compilation of the greatest pedal steel guitar players covering pop songs. The Buddy Emmons cover of "Wichita Linesman" I may already have posted, it is so beautiful, 5 stars. 3 stars for the rest.

That brings us into the new year, I think I'll stop here. Happy New Year!

Saturday, January 23, 2016

The First Law

In mid-December I was in Carmichael's Bookstore on Bardstown Rd in Louisville picking up some books I ordered. The store is like 3 blocks from my youngest daughter's house. For the few physical books I buy I've been ordering them online and having them delivered there and then having my daughter pick them up. So my youngest, her son (my grandson), my middle daughter, and their Uncle Bruce, who was running around with me that afternoon, walked down to Carmichael's with me.

After I got my books, my middle daughter wanted me to pick out a book for her to buy me as an xmas present. Somehow, I chose the trade paper version of "The Blade Itself", the 1st book of "The First Law" trilogy by Joe Abercrombie. Definitely a page turner, after I finished its 500 pages I tore through the 2nd and 3rd books: "Before They Are Hanged" (520 pages) and "Last Argument of Kings" (620 pages).

Kind of "Game of Thrones", but with some "Lord of the Rings" and Arthur/Merlin thrown in. Much more sword than sorcery. One of the 3 main narrators we follow is a torturer. He has an assistant named Severard. An homage to Gene Wolf's Severian character, or following the principle that "severe" in a name is appropriate for a torturer?

Definitely a fun read. And I swear, next book will be something worthwhile.

Monday, December 21, 2015

3 2 5

I mentioned last time I figured out I had already read "Three Parts Dead" by Max Gladstone. So I went on and read the next 2 in this series: "Two Serpents Rise" and "Full Fathom Five". These stories appear to be set on Earth, but an Earth with gods, demons, and wizards. But, it is still an Earth similar in development to ours, with 17 million inhabitant mega-cities and magic-based technology and infrastructure. Hmmm, looking up the links to these books, this series is being called "The Craft Sequence" - craft is what magic is called.

They are all good reads, good plotting, pacing, and characters, and the parallel Earth somehow is interesting. But, looking through my old Fantasy posts, I came across a statement that I have to agree with: that science fiction I think does have new concepts, sometimes useful and important, whereas fantasy is pretty much straight escapism. Oh well, still fun sometimes.

The 1st story deals with a captive god disappearing, I think somewhere in North America, and a priest and novice wizardess trying to figure out what is going on. The 2nd story seems to be Aztecs, in a country where the gods have been killed and the wizards rule. The son of the last priest of the deposed gods and a wizardess cooperate in what is basically a corporate takeover gone bad. The third one appears to be in Hawaii, and most of the characters are female: a priestess and a street urchin channeling something are the 2 main narrative threads. The 2nd and 3rd both have some Dilbertish mockery of corporate culture and corporate-speak.

There's a 4th one out, I think I'll wait a while to read it. Still 24 books unread in my iPad, and I'm 2 months behind on the magazine stack.

Meanwhile, so much sci fi & fantasy coming out on TV. I watched Syfy's 6 hour "Childhood's End" by Arthur C. Clarke. It was OK - production values good, but maybe mostly B-list actors. I think overall that the ideas about aliens in it that were way edgy when the novel came out in 1953 are not so edgy now.

I also watched the 1st episode of "The Expanse" on Syfy. Great production values, and I think better actors. I have read these novels. I think that the amount of world-building for this series is large enough that I will enjoy it more if I let some or all of the episodes build up on the DVR and then binge watch them.

Tuesday, December 08, 2015

Future Visions

"Future Visions", subtitled "Original Science Fiction Inspired by Microsoft", is a collection of 8 short stories and 1 short graphic novel. It has some all-star authors: Greg Bear, Elizabeth Bear, Nancy Kress, Jack McDevitt, Robert J. Sawyer, David Brin, and Ann Leckie, plus a couple of others I hadn't heard of.

Basically, the authors spent time at Microsoft and then wrote stories incorporating 1 of the research areas they had seen. The resulting stories by and large seemed to me to be contrived. (Duh!) I think I liked the David Brin the best, but, from reading his blog, his "Adam Smith Libertarianism" seemed to be bleeding into the story pretty badly.

Well, the collection was free. I'd say I got my money's worth.

Time I think for something more fantastic or magically realistic. Hmmm, I just somehow opened by mistake "Three Parts Dead" by Max Gladstone. We have a winner, ladies and gentlemen!

Or not - starting reading it and realized I'd already read it. A good fantasy, with gods, mages, and gargoyles. I can't find where I blogged it ??? I really, really wished "search this blog" worked better in Blogger blogs. I guess I'll read its sequel(s) instead.

Thursday, December 03, 2015

Ancillary Mercy

"Ancillary Mercy", by Ann Leckie, is the 3rd book in the Ancillary series. I blogged on the 1st 2 books here and here. Amazon says the book is 368 pages long. Hmmm, Amazon has put "(Imperial Radch)" after the title of these three books, although that phrase appears nowhere on the cover or title page???

As I started reading the book, my first thought was, "oh no, here we go, more drinking tea and obsessing over china tea services", and was actually kind of dreading going on. But then, I got totally turned around by this passage, regarding the name of a ship:

"What sort of name is that? Didn't Notai ships usually have long names? Like Ineluctable Ascendancy of Mind Unfolding or The Finite Contains the Infinite Contains the Finite?

Both of those ship names were fictional, characters in more or less melodramatic entertainments.

It's an Iain M. Banks Culture novels tribute! Yay! That is the future I want to live in, a post-scarcity, socialist, anarchist utopia.

So that got me rethinking the whole series. The protagonist is an ancillary - a human body wired up to be a remote peripheral to the AI mind of a starship - who is the only survivor when his ship is destroyed. His mind is that of the ship, so a starship AI is the main character of the series. In addition to the ship AIs, every space station is run by an AI.

It's kind of like The Culture v0.3, with a cloned and networked tyrant governing rather than benevolent AIs.

With that mindset, I greatly enjoyed finishing the book. There is a zany alien ambassador who is fun. The conceit of these novels is that the society is genderless. Everyone is a she, and they sure present as women to me. Take for example these passages, the 1st from Chapter 8, the 2nd from Chapter 9.

Why should she not apologize for being oversensitive?

You've been awake for nearly an hour and you've been crying almost the whole time.

So I was shocked by this sentence in Chapter 5, page 4 of 23 in my eBook:
You'd be proud of him.
??? I presume this was a typo. I think that is the downside of a gimmick - that a slight error in execution leaves the reader wondering if it was intentional or not. I think that, algorithmically, it would have been better to do genderless by alternating between male and female pronouns. That might wind up being totally unreadable. I wonder if she tried it that way? Note that ancillaries are referred to as "it", so the genderless pronoun is spoken for.

I think next I am going to read a free collection of short stories from Microsoft. Still 25 unread books on my iPad, so I think I'm going to keep reading more junk until the new year.

Saturday, November 28, 2015

The Memory of Sky

"The Memory of Sky" is the latest novel by Robert Reed. It is presented as 3 books and is subtitled "A Great Ship Trilogy", so maybe it was initially serialized. Amazon says it has 624 pages.

Reed has done several Great Ship novels and stories. A huge (maybe Jupiter sized?) primordial spaceship that orbits the galaxy comes under the control of humans. There are numerous environments within The Great Ship, in this case a sealed sphere. I am not sure I ever got an accurate picture of how this environment's trees, reefs, and sun were laid out - a diagram would have been nice.

I realized that most of these Great Ship stories are artificial worlds stories. Somehow about 1/2 way through these stories I was strongly reminded of Philip Jose Farmer's World of Tiers stories, although there aren't that many similarities.

The book moves along pretty well. 4 alien children with possibly revolutionary powers completely destabilize society, as factions vie to control the children to exploit their powers. The main child that is follows is sometimes sympathetic, sometimes not.

The ending to the story happens quickly and completely out of left field. It seems to be suggesting more novels with these characters, but in a completely different environment. Again, I was really kind of thrown by the ending. But, Reed writes well, it was a diverting story, not sure there's much edge there. Reed I first remember for some totally edgy stories in Year's Best. So, still worth a read.

Sunday, November 22, 2015

Music In - September and October

Right at 2 months since I did this last, not too bad. Here we go.
  • Beach House, "Depression Cherry". Nice, laid back indie pop with female voices. 3 stars.
  • Joanna Newsom, "Have One On Me", 2010. My daugthter Alexis pointed me at this song, "Good Intentions Paving Co.". Great tune, chords you don't expect, great harmony. Ms. Newsom's primary instrument is harp but she also plays piano. She has quite a quirky voice. This was a "3 disc" album. 4 stars for this tune, 3 stars for the rest.
  • Destroyer, "Poison Season". At first I thought this was too energetic for me, but it grew on me. His vocals are so stylized, I would think I'd be tired of them by now. But, not just yet. 4 stars.
  • Ben Folds, "So There". Folds shows some attitude on this album, kind of like he's expecting criticism. It's a great album. Recorded with a full orchestra, the last 3 tracks are a piano concerto, nice! The other 8 tracks are more of Ben's normal catchy pop tunes. 4 stars.
  • Beirut, "No No No". Surprisingly good - not sure why the surprise, this is the 4th album of theirs that I have. Catchy balkan pop tunes from a great Brooklyn band. I think my favorite was actually the instrumental "As Needed", which is unusual for me. 4 stars.

  • Dirty Projectors + Björk, "Mount Wittenberg Orca", 2011. I had been really enjoying the latest Dirty Projectors album, so I decided to go back and start harvesting their earlier stuff. I was pleasantly surprised to find that their previous work was a 7 song suite with Björk, the world's greatest living composer! A lot of fun, the voices go well together. Here's "On And Ever Onward", only 2 minutes. 4 stars.

  • Beach House, "Thank Your Lucky Stars". 2 albums out within 2 months of each other??? More of the same, very pleasant and laid back. 3 stars.
  • Buffalo Springfield, "Retrospective - The Best of Buffalo Springfield", 1969. Ripped from vinyl. Some great songs: "Kind Woman", "Bluebird", "Rock And Roll Woman", "I Am A Child". I had forgotten that Neal Young was in this band for a while, I always thought of it as Stephen Stills' band. Unfortunately, on a few of the tracks one channel seems to fade out. I may see if I can fix it with the Audacity software, but I am not hopeful. 4 stars.
  • Jimmy Buffett, "Changes In Latitudes, Changes In Attitudes", 1977. Who knew I had any Jimmy Buffett? All easy to listen to. 3 stars.
  • Gary Burton, "Throb", 1969. Probably still the world's greatest living vibraphone player. The 1st track, I'm going, oof, this guitarist is playing some sucky rock riffs, but, they are not really that bad, and when he switches to more jazz riffs, he's much stronger. Some nice tunes. 3 stars, 4 stars for "Turn OF The Century", which is the only song from the album I remember from Back In The Day.

That brings us up to late October. Only 4 albums in the "_Unrated" list, I guess I'll rip some vinyl next week.

Saturday, November 21, 2015

Luna: New Moon

I just finished "Luna: New Moon", by Ian McDonald. This is a hard sci-fi story set on the moon late in this century. The population of the moon is 1.7 million. The 2nd generation of moon-born people are reaching adulthood. 5 "Dragons", basically industrial barons, control the moon and scheme against each other. The moon is I guess a libertarian paradise - there are no laws, everything is done by contracts. There are courts, but the litigants must hire the courtroom, the judges, the jury, whatever is required. There is a courtroom arena where disputes can be settled by combat - shades of "The Dosadi Experiment".

Meanwhile, as soon you arrive on the moon, you are fitted with a heads-up display showing you your account balances for the Four Elementals: air, water, earth, and, replacing fire, data. Low tier workers - serfs in this feudal system - are always struggling to keep these balances positive.

McDonald is a very good writer, and you really get a feel for what life on this version of the moon might be like. The characters are well drawn. Early on, the book reminded me of the old TV series "Dallas": feuding extractive industry clans, with family members matching lots of archetypes: the golden boy, the schemer, the warrior, the mystic, etc.

Also interesting was that, in keeping with the libertarian political setup, the sexual mores are quite creative - most of the characters are bisexual, but there are also asexual and me-sexual orientations. There are a fair number of sex scenes. I'm definitely getting old, not that much interest to me :-O

The book is 416 pages, it seems like is should have been longer - I was surprised when I checked and I was 3/4 of the way thru. It definitely violated my "100 pages per narrative thread" heuristic - I counted a minimum of 8 narrators, meaning it should have been 2x as long. But, it does wind up with a rousing and logical conclusion.

McDonald could conceivably write a sequel to this, but he seems to have enough new ideas to keep exploring new settings for his novels. My hat's off to him for that. There are some of my favorite authors where I am getting tired of reading sequels, and I think they are getting tired of writing them. But, I'm sure it is not the easiest way to make a buck.

1 of the 11 chapters of the book had already been published as the short story (or novella) "The Fifth Dragon", which I had already read. So McDonald got to do a little double-dipping there. I guess that's pretty common, not sure I enjoy it tho. Still, this is a most excellent read, and Joe Bob definitely sez, "Check it out".

Sunday, November 15, 2015

Misbehaving

"Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics" is a recently published book by Richard H. Thaler, currently the Ralph and Dorothy Keller Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Earlier in his career he spent many years at Cornell. He was one of the founders of behavioral economics.

The book is semi-autobiographical, the tale of a young iconoclast and his stalwart allies seeking validation and acceptance for new, more realistic foundations for economics, particularly in how people are modeled. The writing is for the general public, and the book is very readable. There are humorous anecdotes and jokes. The cast of supporting characters contains many of the prominent economists of the 2nd 1/2 of the 20th century - I linked to the Wikipedia articles of a lot of these.

I found it somewhat disingenuous for the obviously very accomplished author to tell us several times how lazy he is. Also, the writing seemed a little disorganized in places: he would introduce 2 terms, define 1, start telling stories, and forget to define the 2nd; or he says he's going to talk about a list, but it is hard to identify just what the items in the list are. This was much more noticeable when I made the pass through to prepare this summary.

I also found some of the chapters towards the end of the book to be a little off-target. Yes, they were about humans "misbehaving", but not so much about economics. I guess it just shows that humans "misbehaving" doesn't just occur in their economic decisions.

The book is 432 pages. It has a preface and a conclusion, and 33 chapters in 8 generally chronological sections and an interlude. Thaler describes in detail many of the experiments he and other researchers performed in developing this new science. I will mostly skip these details and focus on the results of the experiments.


Prior to behavioral economics, people were assumed to be "perfectly rational" - and also highly skilled mathematicians, at least intuitively. All economic decisions - how much to charge or pay for an item, how much to pay or demand for wages - are made with perfect rationality, and possibly using models that span the entire lifetime of the decision maker! Thaler devoted his career to exploring what happens when you realize that people are far from "perfectly rational", and are in fact prone to numerous cognitive biases. Yay, these are a favorite topic of mine, and have been discussed before in this blog as "cognitive illusions".


Section 1 is titled "Beginnings: 1970-78". In this section Thaler lays the groundwork that led him to his work at Cornell.

In traditional economics, anything outside of perfect rationality is a SIF - Supposedly Irrelevant Factor, the title of Chapter 1. Thaler defines the "perfectly rational" people in standard economics as "Econs". The more realistic people who misbehave (as in the title of the book) per standard economics he defines as "Humans". Thaler gives a simple definition of economics:

This premise of constrained optimization, that is, choosing the best from a limited budget, is combined with the other major workhorse of economic theory, that of equilibrium. In competitive markets where prices are free to move up and down, those prices fluctuate in such a way that supply equals demand. To simplify somewhat, we can say that Optimization + Equilibrium = Economics.
Chapter 2 is titled for one of the most important of the cognitive biases that exist in the human mind, which Thaler calls the endowment effect. Humans weight more strongly things they already have than things they don't, even if economically there is no difference. Hmmm, is this basically "A bird in the hand is worth 2 in the bush"? Thaler's thesis and one of his early papers looked at "The Value of Saving a Life" (currently around $7M).

In Chapter 3, "The List", Thaler goes into "Dumb stuff people do", which he kept in a list on the blackboard in his office starting in the mid '70s. One example we can all relate to is that humans consistently ignore the economic dictum "Ignore sunk costs". Sunk costs are money that has already been spent. Later in the book where is a funny story, where he is chiding his daughter about skipping lessons in an after-school ski program (prepaid), and the daughter replying

"Ha! Sunk costs!" Only the daughter of an economist would come up with that line.
But everyone I know does that. If we've spent money on something, by gawd, we want to get "our money's worth", even if it inconveniences or otherwise negatively affects us.

Another cognitive bias: "hindsight bias" ... after the fact, we think that we always knew the outcome was likely, if not a foregone conclusion. Hindsight bias on the part of corporate managers helps keep corporate underlings from pushing for risky projects - because if the project fails, the manager will be sure that he had opposed it from day 1.

One paper that affected Thaler's early work was titled "Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", by 2 psychologists who became his mentors, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. I always think of heuristics, or "rules of thumb", that we use to solve problems as good things. But, they aren't always. Sometimes they mislead us, and then they are better characterized as a bias.

This is an illustration of the big idea of this article, one that made my hands shake as I read: using these heuristics causes people to make predictable errors.
Tversky and Kahnemann's theory was first known as "Value Theory", the title of Chapter 4. It later became known as "Prospect Theory",
The organizing principle was the existence of two different kinds of theories: normative and descriptive. Normative theories tell you the right way to think about some problem. By “right” I do not mean right in some moral sense; instead, I mean logically consistent, as prescribed by the optimizing model at the heart of economic reasoning, sometimes called rational choice theory.

...

This gets to the heart of the problem with traditional economics and the conceptual breakthrough offered by prospect theory. Economic theory at that time, and for most economists today, uses one theory to serve both normative and descriptive purposes.

He illustrates this with a problem involving the Pythagorean theorem (the normative theory), where we are asked to guess the outcome of the problem. I guessed what most people do (the descriptive theory) - which turns out to be off by a factor of around 200! Hmmm, I think maybe other terms for "descriptive theory" would be "folk psychology" or "common sense".

One forerunner of "prospect theory" was the concept of "bounded rationality" put forward by Herbert Simon. We also learn about "risk aversion" and "expected utility theory". The former was initially developed by Bernoulli, the latter by von Neumann. Both assume rational behavior, i.e., Econs as the actors.

Next we learn about the Weber-Fechner Law of psychology. and what psychologists refer to as a just-noticeable difference or JND:

The Weber-Fechner Law holds that the just-noticeable difference in any variable is proportional to the magnitude of that variable.

...

The difference between losing $10 and $20 feels much bigger than the difference between losing $1,300 and $1,310.

This law is instantiated in the value function shown below. This function also incorporates one of Thaler's early experimental results: that people hate losses more than they like gains, a corollary of the endowment effect, known as "loss aversion".

Working with the psychologists taught Thaler how to conduct experiments by asking questions. However, the economic wisdom of the time was that people might answer hypothetical questions as Humans, but when it came to spending real money, they would answer as Econs.

Thaler started working at Cornell in August, 1978. In Chapter 6, "The Gauntlet", he describes "reasons why economists could safely ignore behaviors such as those on the List". He heard these some or all of the time he presented is new ideas, making him feel like he was running the gauntlet over and over.

First up in the gauntlet is the "As If" argument:

even if people are not capable of actually solving the complex problems that economists assume they can handle, they behave “as if” they can.
One example was "marginal analysis" applied to hiring in a firm. Marginal analysis in this case says that the manager will decide to hire more people as long as the marginal (or incremental) cost of hiring a worker is equal to or less than the increases in revenue that the worker produces. Talking to real-life managers reveals that they have no knowledge of these numbers and do not even vaguely use marginal analysis. But the argument was carried by Milton Friedman and "Positive Economics":
Friedman argued that it was silly to evaluate a theory based on the realism of its assumptions. What mattered was the accuracy of the theory’s predictions.
Friedman used as an example an expert billiard player, who could make all kinds of shots without measuring angles, using a calculator, etc. Thaler answered in his 1st behavioral economics paper "Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice".
I too began with billiards. My main point was that economics is supposed to be a theory of everyone, not only experts. An expert billiard player might play as if he knows all the relevant geometry and physics, but the typical bar player usually aims at the ball closest to a pocket and shoots, often missing. If we are going to have useful theories about how typical people shop, save for retirement, search for a job, or cook dinner, those theories had better not assume that people behave as if they were experts.
The next argument in the gauntlet involves incentives:
Economists put great stock in incentives. If the stakes are raised, the argument goes, people will have greater incentive to think harder, ask for help, or do what is necessary to get the problem right.

...

This assertion, unsupported by any evidence, was firmly believed, even in spite of the fact that nothing in the theory or practice of economics suggested that economics only applies to large-stakes problems.

The next argument in the gauntlet involves learning - that people will learn to act like Econs over time. But, Thaler notes that large-stakes problems - buying a house or car, determining your retirement strategy - do not come along very often, so, we have very little chance to practice with such problems. On the other hand, small problems come along much more frequently, and we have many more chances to improve our decision making on such problems.
Psychologists tell us that in order to learn from experience, two ingredients are necessary: frequent practice and immediate feedback.

...

The learning and incentives arguments are, to some extent, contradictory.

The penultimate item in the gauntlet Thaler calls "the invisible handwave". This a reference to Adam Smith's invisible hand:
The vague argument is that markets somehow discipline people who are misbehaving. Handwaving is a must because there is no logical way to arrive at a conclusion that markets transform people into rational agents.
The final item in the gauntlet is a combination of earlier items:
Sometimes the invisible handwave is combined with the incentives argument to suggest that when the stakes are high and the choices are difficult, people will go out and hire experts to help them. The problem with this argument is that it can be hard to find a true expert who does not have a conflict of interest.
More misbehaving: psychologists Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic performed experiments that led to the discovery of "preference reversals".
This finding upset a theoretical foundation essential to any formal economic theory, namely that people have what are called “well-defined preferences,” which simply means that we consistently know what we like. Economists don’t care whether you like a firm mattress better than a soft one or vice versa, but they cannot tolerate you saying that you like a firm mattress better than a soft one and a soft one better than a firm one. That will not do. Economic theory textbooks would stop on the first page if the assumption of well-ordered preferences had to be abandoned, because without stable preferences there is nothing to be optimized.
This was the background against which Thaler chose the top 2 topics he would explore.
The first was to understand the psychology of spending, saving, and other household financial behavior, what has now become known as mental accounting. The second was self-control and, more generally, choosing between now and later.
Another description for mental accounting might be "folk economics".


Section 2 is titled "Mental Accounting: 1979-85". Chapter 7 is titled "Bargains and Rip-Offs". When do we think we got a good deal vs not? Thaler introduces 2 terms:

  • Acquisition utility is based on standard economic theory and is equivalent to what economists call “consumer surplus.” As the name suggests, it is the surplus remaining after we measure the utility of the object gained and then subtract the opportunity cost of what has to be given up. For an Econ, acquisition utility is the end of the story.
  • transaction utility ... is defined as the difference between the price actually paid for the object and the price one would normally expect to pay, the reference price. Negative transaction utility is a “rip-off.” In contrast, if the price is below the reference price, then transaction utility is positive, a “bargain”
I don't know anyone who doesn't love a bargain, or who doesn't hate getting ripped off. Sellers have manipulated this for years.
Because consumers think this way, sellers have an incentive to manipulate the perceived reference price and create the illusion of a “deal.” One example that has been used for decades is announcing a largely fictional “suggested retail price,” which actually just serves as a misleading suggested reference price. In America, some products always seem to be on sale, such as rugs and mattresses, and at some retailers, men’s suits. Goods that are marketed this way share two characteristics: they are bought infrequently and quality is difficult to assess. The infrequent purchases help because consumers often do not notice that there is always a sale going on.
Another example is the complicated-to-the-point-of-baroque couponing schemes used by department stores. But Thaler says that when Macy's and JC Penney tried to get away from constant sales and coupons their sales dropped. People will buy more if they think they are getting a deal.

Similarly, attempts to replace the annoying $9.95 or $9.99 price with a $10 price also led to reduced sales and were abandoned.

Chapter 8 is devoted to sunk costs, or, more accurately, the "sunk cost fallacy". Funny how once you start talking about the psychology of economics, old adages seem to spring to mind. Thaler in this chapter mentions "don't cry over spilt milk" and "let bygones be bygones" as being related to the economists dictum to ignore sunk costs.

But it is not just us Humans who refuse to ignore sunk costs. Thaler talks about how perhaps the US "continued its futile war in Vietnam because we had invested too much to quit." It seems like in every war of our ongoing series of wars that statements such as "we cannot allow our troops deaths to have been in vain" are used to justify our continued involvement. Somehow I don't think telling the hawks that "economists say to ignore sunk costs" would do much good.

Another example of Humans failing to ignore sunk costs comes from a fitness club that bills its members 2x a year:

attendance at the club jumps the month after the bill arrives, then tails off over time until the next bill arrives. They called this phenomenon “payment depreciation,” meaning that the effects of sunk costs wear off over time.
Chapter 9 is titled "Buckets and Budgets".
For families that dealt mostly in cash (credit cards were just coming into use at this time in the late 1970s), many would often use some version of an envelope system. One envelope (or mason jar) for rent, another for food, another for utilities, and so forth.

...

Organizations do something similar. Departments have budgets, and there are limits for specific categories within those budgets. The existence of budgets can violate another first principle of economics: money is fungible, meaning that it has no labels restricting what it can be spent on.

Violations of this economic dictum, that money is fungible, takes some surprising forms. I definitely would not expect the result of a 2008 survey: that, when gas prices drop a lot, people take more road trips, but also fill their cars up with higher grade gas!

Another division of money is into cash, savings, and long-term (retirement) savings. Here too, people behave in illogical ways, such as not paying off high interest credit card debt with money from a savings account earning low interest. Ha ha, people know they are Humans, not Econs, and don't trust themselves to do the right thing later.

Chapter 10 is titled "At the Poker Table".

My poker observations yielded another wrinkle on mental accounts. Players who were ahead in the game did not seem to treat their winnings as “real money.” This behavior is so pervasive that casino gamblers have a term for it: “gambling with the house’s money.”
The other major misbehavior shown in gambling is the "break even effect". Gamblers who are behind feel they have to continue to gamble so they can "break even". They refuse to realize that their losses so far represent sunk costs.


Section 3 is titled "Self-Control: 1975-88". One of Thaler's early examples of non-Econ behavior was the act of putting a bowl of cashews out of sight to eat less of them. This is non-Econ because Econs always want choices and will always make the right choice, in this case, to not binge on the cashews.

Chapter 11 is titled "Willpower? No Problem". No less than the father of economics, Adam Smith, is quoted on the issue of willpower:

The crucial feature of Smith’s conception of our passions is that they are myopic, that is, shortsighted. As he framed it, the problem is that “The pleasure which we are to enjoy ten years hence, interests us so little in comparison with that which we may enjoy to-day.”
This came from Smith's earlier book, "The Theory of Moral Sentiments". I have seen several references to this book lately, I may have to add it to the reading list.

The 1st modern discussion of this was by Irving Fisher in 1930. He "believed that time preference depends on an individual's level of income, with the poor being more impatient than those who are better off." The formulation of this principle that is still widely used in economics came from Paul Samuelson in 1937.

The basic idea is that consumption is worth more to you now than later. If given the choice between a great dinner this week or one a year from now, most of us would prefer the dinner sooner rather than later. Using the Samuelson formulation, we are said to “discount” future consumption at some rate. If a dinner a year from now is only considered to be 90% as good as one right now, we are said to be discounting the future dinner at an annual rate of about 10%.
This methodology is known as the discounted utility model with exponential discounting. Samuelson noted that the utility discount probably is not constant over time.
Samuelson correctly notes that if people discount the future at rates that vary over time, then people may not behave consistently, that is, they may change their minds as time moves forward.
In fact, most people greatly discount the near future much more heavily than the far future. This is known as "quasi-hyperbolic or present-biased discounting". But, economists developed "theory-induced blindness", and chose to use the flat exponential discounting. And it got worse from there. For, the concept of "intertemporal choice" also plays a big role in macroeconomics, "where it underlies the consumption function, which tells us how the spending of a household varies with its income". This is a key factor in predicting the effect of tax cuts or other economic stimuli. The progression of economic thought in determining this function is somewhat funny but also somewhat scary. What does a family save when given a tax refund or other windfall?

  1. John Maynard Keynes, in his "General Theory" published in 1936, stated that a family would save the same percentage amount that they did with their normal income up front. This percentage would increase as family wealth went up.
  2. Milton Friedman in 1957 proposed the "permanent income hypothesis", under which a family would save the same percentage as above, but would then spread out the consumption of the rest over 3 years.
  3. Shortly thereafter, Franco Modigliani and Richard Brumberg proposed the "life-cycle hypothesis", where the family spreads out the consumption of the windfall over life!
  4. Finally, modern economist Robert Barro theorizes that the family will spread out the consumption of the windfall over its own life, but also over the life of its children, grandchildren - "effectively forever". But "if the windfall is a temporary tax cut that is financed by issuing government bonds, then Barro’s prediction changes. The bonds will have to be repaid eventually. The beneficiary of the tax cut understands all this, and realizes that his heir’s taxes will eventually have to go up to pay for the tax cut he is receiving, so he won’t spend any of it. Instead he will increase his bequests by exactly the amount of the tax cut." Seriously? That is one smart Econ!
Thaler and Hersh Shefrin came up with a behavorial alternative to this convoluted cleverness with the "behavioral life-cycle hypothesis". Basically they incorporate mental accounts, such that how the money is spent or saved depends on the current state of the family's various mental accounts.

Chapter 12 is titled "The Planner and The Doer" and gives our 1st glimpse of Thaler's concept of a Human. In the late 1970s, Thaler found 2 "treasures" in the study of "delayed gratification".

  1. Psychologist Walter Mischel experimented with children choosing between "a small reward now and a larger reward a bit later". The kids did better if the treats (marshmallows or oreos) were out of sight. Particularly interesting was that 1/3 of these test subjects were followed and questioned every decade for the next several decades. "The amount of time a kid waited in one of those experiments turned out to be a valid predictor of many important life outcomes, from SAT scores to career success to drug use."
  2. Psychiatrist George Ainslie published a paper in 1975 which "summarized everything academics knew about self-control at the time". In particular, animal studies, mostly rats and pigeons, had generated lots of data, which showed "Animals discount hyperbolically, and have self-control problems too!"
Here's a funny anecdote related to Mischel's work:
Mischel has priceless videos from some of the early experiments that demonstrate the difficulty kids had in exerting self-control. There is one kid I am particularly curious about. He was in the toughest setup, in which the bigger prize, three delicious Oreo cookies, was sitting right in front of him. After a brief wait, he could not stand it anymore. But rather than ring the bell, he carefully opened each cookie, licked out the yummy white filling, and then put the cookie back together, arranging the three cookies as best he could to avoid detection. In my imagination, this kid grows up to be Bernie Madoff.

Thaler got inspiration from this quote by social scientist Donald McIntosh:

“The idea of self-control is paradoxical unless it is assumed that the psyche contains more than one energy system, and that these energy systems have some degree of independence from each other.”
So Thaler concludes "Maybe I needed a model with two selves." He christens these 2 selves The Planner and The Doer.
There is a forward-looking “planner” who has good intentions and cares about the future, and a devil-may-care “doer” who lives for the present.
But how do they interact? Making them competitors in a game and using game theory was rejected. Instead they used a model popular at the University of Rochester, where Thaler had taught. It came from the theory of organizations, and was called the "principal-agent model". In organizations, the principal is the boss and the agent is the employee, and they have asymmetric knowledge and authority.
In our intrapersonal framework, the agents are a series of short-lived doers; specifically, we assume there is a new doer each time period, say each day. The doer wants to enjoy himself and is completely selfish in that that he does not care at all about any future doers. The planner, in contrast, is completely altruistic. All she cares about is the utility of the series of doers. (Think of her as a benevolent dictator.) She would like them to be collectively as happy as possible, but she has limited control over the actions of the doers, especially if a doer is aroused in any way, such as by food, sex, alcohol, or an urgent desire to go outside and goof off on a nice day.

The planner has two sets of tools she can use to influence the actions of the doers. She can either try to influence the decisions that the doers make through rewards or penalties (financial or otherwise) that still allow them discretion, or she can impose rules, such as commitment strategies, which limit the doers’ options

But Thaler's theory turned out not to be too popular. Since around 1997, the main model of self control has been the "beta-delta model", which appears to be pretty much quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Also now in the mix is the degree to which people are "aware of their self-control problems". Are they "sophisticated" or "naïve"? Or are they somewhere in between: "partial naiveté"?
Most of us realize that we have self-control problems, but we underestimate their severity.

Section 4 is titled "Working With Danny: 1984-85". The 3 chapters all deal with the issue of fairness, explored in work Thaler did with Daniel Kahneman in Vancouver.

Chapter 14 is titled "What Seems Fair?". We have already discussed "bargains" and "ripoffs". Kahneman and Thaler got access to free telephone polling from the Canadian government and "we were able to try out lots of ideas, get quick feedback, and learn in the best possible way: theory-driven intuition tested by trial and error." Price gouging is universally despised, as you would expect. The endowment effect is invoked again:

Both buyers and sellers feel entitled to the terms of trade to which they have become accustomed, and treat any deterioration of those terms as a loss.
Wage stickiness seems to me to be another example of this. Even worse is the example of a vending machine, say selling cold Coke, whose prices change, rising as the temperature does. Coke actually tried this, and the uproar cost the CEO who championed the idea his job. Uber surge pricing is another example which has led to major consumer push-back.

Chapter 15 is titled "Fairness Games". These experimental games include: the Ultimatum Game; the Dictator Game and an offshoot called the Punishment Game; the Prisoner's Dilemma and an offshoot called the Public Goods Game. The results of all these games contradict what standard economics would predict. People will try to be altruistic when they can. I found it interesting that in the Public Goods Game, people would put about 50% of their holdings into the common pot, which I think is around the percentage required to maintain a modern state with universal health care and basic income.

a large proportion of people can be categorized as conditional cooperators, meaning that they are willing to cooperate if enough others do.
Chapter 16 is titled "Mugs", referring to the prize of another game. This game showed that the endowment effect can apply to things that we have had only a very short time: the "instant endowment effect". We also find that the endowment effect has a partner. Known as "inertia" in physics, in economics it becomes "status quo bias".
People ... stick with what they have unless there is some good reason to switch, or perhaps despite there being a good reason to switch.


Section 5 is titled "Engaging with the Economics Profession: 1986-94". This section is mostly about Thaler battling to get traction with the mainstream economics community. A conference in October 1985 was one of the 1st engagements. The best argument of the behavioral side was made by Kenneth Arrow:

rationality (meaning optimization) is neither necessary nor sufficient to do good economic theory.
Thaler spoke on the the items in "the Gauntlet", covered above, and proposed that discussions could avoid lots of wasted time if everyone agreed that the following 2 statements were false:
1. Rational models are useless.

2. All behavior is rational.

A surprise at this conference was a paper by Merton Miller, who was on the traditionalist side. Thaler summarizes Miller's paper as:
Theory tells us that firms should not pay dividends and yet they do. And a behavioral model admittedly best describes the pattern by which they pay them.
Chapter 18 is titled "Anomalies". Thaler got a great chance to push his ideas via writing a column on anomalies, or examples of misbehaving, in a new journal, the Journal of Economic Perspectives, edited by Joseph Stiglitz, who is probably currently my fav economist after Paul Krugman. Thaler framed this in the context of looking for a paradigm shift, as defined in Thomas Kuhn's book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The column was a success, with 1/2 of the readers of the journal reporting that they read the "Anomalies" feature "regularly".

Chapter 19 is titled "Forming a Team", and chronicles the growth of behavioral economics.

In the late 1980s, there were really just three people besides me who thought of themselves as behavioral economists. One was George Loewenstein ... . Another was Robert Shiller, and the third was Colin Camerer.
Colin Camerer has "has been at the forefront of neuro-economics, which uses techniques such as brain imaging to learn more about how people make decisions." Behavioral economics has hardware!

Thaler got the Russel Sage Foundation to provide funding that led to 2 meetings of all-star groups of psychologists and behavioral economists. But the outcome of these meeting was disappointing. Basically, he says that "interdisciplinary is hard", because of disjoint vocabulary and knowledge bases. After that, in 1992, the Foundation funded the Behavioral Economics Roundtable. They put on a 2 week "summer camp" each year. These attracted new, young talent to the field. At the 1st meeting, one of those was Ernst Fehr, whose 1st paper

showed that in a laboratory setting, “firms” that elected to pay more than the minimum wage were rewarded with higher effort levels by their “workers.” This result supported the idea, initially proposed by George Akerlof, that employment contracts could be viewed partially as a gift exchange. The theory is that if the employer treats the worker well, in terms of pay and working conditions, that gift will be reciprocated with higher effort levels and lower turnover, thus making the payment of above-market wages economically profitable.
As of 2014, there had been 10 summer camps, with over 300 graduates. Behavioral economics was a going concern.

Chapter 20 is titled "Narrow Framing on the Upper East Side". The Russell Sage Foundation also had a visiting scholars program on the Upper East Side of Manhattan. This longish chapter mostly explores the flavor of misbehaving which they called "narrow framing".

when do people get themselves into trouble by treating events one at a time, rather than as a portfolio?

...

decision-making was driven by two countervailing, but not necessarily offsetting, biases: bold forecasts and timid choices.

There is an interesting illustration of "bold forecasts" from the book "Thinking, Fast and Slow". Members of a group make estimates of the time needed to create a curriculum on decision-making for middle school students. The estimates range from 18 to 30 months. Then they ask one member who is an expert in curriculum development. He answers "no group had finished a similar task in less than seven years, and worse, 40% of the teams never finished!" This contrasts the "outside view" versus the "inside view".

"Timid choices" refers to loss aversion, which we saw above. An extended example of a CEO determining how many new projects to take on illustrates this.

Another anomaly or misbehavior discussed is the "equity premium puzzle". The equity premium refers to the higher returns of equities (stocks) vs bonds, due to the increased risk associated with equities.The puzzle is that, when economists did the math, the equity premium computed as "0.35%, nowhere near the historical 6%".

Thaler attributes this behavior to "myopic loss aversion". The cognitive bias is to weight short-term events more heavily than long-term. Hmmm, kind of like hyperbolic discounting that we saw in the discussion on self control. In the short-term, stocks can be scary, and we let that override their provable long-term benefit. There are also examples given of this phenomenon involving series of bets.


Section 6 is titled "Finance: 1983-03". Playing the stock market is the Ultimate Test.

Nothing would help the cause of behavioral economics more than to show that behavioral biases matter in financial markets, where there are not only high stakes but also ample opportunities for professional traders to exploit the mistakes made by others. Any non-Econs (amateurs) or non-Econ behavior (even by experts) should theoretically have no chance of surviving.
Chapter 21 it titled "The Beauty Contest". This refers to Keynes likening picking the best stocks to going through photos of pretty women and picking not the ones you find prettiest, but the ones that you think other pickers will find prettiest. But, no, that's not good enough, you should pick the ones you think the other pickers will pick, and you are now in a recursive loop.

This concept was explored in read life via an experiment delivered by the Financial Times in 1997. Readers were asked:

Guess a number from 0 to 100 with the goal of making your guess as close as possible to two-thirds of the average guess of all those participating in the contest.
The winning guess (13) showed that most of those who played recursed to the 3rd level. Note that per game theory, you should pick 0 as your answer - that is the Nash equilibrium in this game, and some Econs did indeed make that their answer.

Traditional economics posits that the stock market should follow the "Efficient Market Hypothesis", or EMH, of Eugene Fama. The EMH has 2 components:

  1. the rationality of prices, or "the price is right". "Essentially, the idea is that any asset will sell for its true “intrinsic value”" ... " If prices are “right,” there can never be bubbles."
  2. the nonexistence of a way to "beat the market", or "there is no free lunch". "because all publicly available information is reflected in current stock prices, it is impossible to reliably predict future prices and make a profit."
Chapter 22 is titled "Does the Stock Market Overreact?". Hah, I think we all know the answer to that. Thaler states that "shares turn over at a rate of 5% per month" - hard to explain in a world of Econs.

I enjoyed the Groucho Marx theorem.

Groucho famously said that he would never want to belong to any club that would have him as a member. The economist’s version of this joke — predictably, not as funny — is that no rational agent will want to buy a stock that some other rational agent is willing to sell.
So "most financial economists agree ... that trading volume is surprisingly high." One reason given is "overconfidence" - every trader thinks that they are smarter than the other traders. Thaler finds this implausible. Instead he goes back to Keynes, who felt traders overreacted "to "ephemeral and non-significant" day-to-day information".

So volatility is a problem with EMH. Another problem of a different type: the superior performance of value stocks (low P/E) compared to growth stocks (high P/E). And another problem: a study by one of Fama's students found that "portfolios of small firms outperformed portfolios of large firms".

Thaler and his 1st behavioral economics grad student, Werner De Bondt, explained the discrepancy between value and growth stocks based on simple regression toward the mean - outliers will naturally tend back towards average values. Helping to drive the regression toward the mean was that the outlier stocks got that way because of "generalized overreaction" by traders - another form of misbehaving. Thaler and De Bondt did a study that showed low performing stocks consistently did better than high performing stocks, going forward, confirming overreaction and contradicting the EMH, which says "the past cannot predict the future".

Chapter 23 is titled "The Reaction to Overreaction". The Traditionalists Strike Back, led by Fama. Ha ha, a nice case of "model creep". So 1st, they say you need to look at "some model of risk and return" as well as market efficiency.

At that time, the right and proper way to measure the risk of a stock was to use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed independently by financial economists John Lintner and William Sharpe.

According to the CAPM, the only risk that gets rewarded in a rational world is the degree to which a stock’s return is correlated with the rest of the market ... a measure that is called “beta.”

Thaler and De Bondt checked the beta value for their low vs high performing stocks - the average beta was lower for the low performing stocks, meaning, they were less risky - so no help for EMH there.

Next up: the "Fama-French Three Factor Model". In addition to beta, the size of the company must be factored in with small cap stocks favored. But there were still problems, so 2 more factors were added: the firm's profitability, and how aggressively the firm invests. And finally, "many practitioners would add a sixth factor: momentum." So we are left hanging as to why value stocks outperform growth stocks:

the debate has continued for years as to whether value stocks are mispriced, as behavioralists argue, or risky, as rationalists claim.
Chapter 24 is titled "The Price Is Not Right". Another blow is struck against EMH by a paper published in 1981 by Robert Shiller titled “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?” Shiller noted that a dividend stock's price should be correlated with the future dividends that stock will pay. But when he studied data going back to 1871, he found that the stock price varied wildly while the future dividend forecast varied hardly at all. "Shiller’s results caused a firestorm in finance circles."

But a far more damning argument against "the price is right" came on Monday, October 19, 1987, when stock prices fell drastically all over the world, for no apparent reason. In 1984, De Bondt published a paper titled "Stock Prices and Social Dynamics", which stated

social phenomena might influence stock prices just as much as they do fashion trends. Hemlines go up and down without any apparent reason; might not stock prices be influenced in other similar ways that seem to be beyond the standard economist's purview?
So we come back to what Keynes called "animal spirits".

Chapter 25 is titled "The Battle of Closed-End Funds" and takes another swipe at "the price is right".

an important principle at the very heart of the EMH [is] the law of one price. The law asserts that in an efficient market, the same asset cannot simultaneously sell for two different prices.
A contradiction to the law of 1 price was easy to find: closed-end mutual funds. These funds have a fixed number of shares, and should always be priced at the total asset values of their holdings (Net Asset Value or NAV) divided by the number of shares in the fund. Instead, their prices vary over time, and are both higher and lower than the rational price. Additionally, a normal pattern for these funds is that are sold with a 7% commission but usually within 6 months have lost 10% of their share value.
So the first puzzle is: why does anyone buy an asset for $107 that will predictably be worth $90 in six months? This pattern had induced Benjamin Graham to refer to closed-end funds as “an expensive monument erected to the inertia and stupidity of stockholders.”
Larry Summers had an unpublished paper that started "THERE ARE IDIOTS". Summers and some of his former students had written papers that talked about "noise traders", who react to noise (called SIFs earlier) instead of news. Thaler and a grad student wrote a paper that speculated that individual, rather than institutional, investors were more sensitive to "investor sentiment". They identified individual investors as tending to buy more small cap stocks and closed-end funds than institutional investors, so they investigated these. They found
The average discount on closed-end funds was correlated with the difference in returns between small and large company stocks; the greater the discount, the larger the difference in returns between those two types of stocks. This finding was the equivalent of finding footprints for Bigfoot or some other creature that is thought to be a myth.
Chapter 26 is titled "Fruit Flies, Icebergs, and Negative Stock Prices". In another example of "the price is not right", Thaler explores in depth a case from 1999 as 3Com was spinning off Palm. At one point, based on the prices of the 2 stocks, the implication was that the total worth of 3Com without Palm was negative $23B! So a clear violation of the "one price" rule.

Concluding his analysis the EMH, Thaler concludes

It should be stressed that as a normative benchmark of how the world should be, the EMH has been extraordinarily useful. In a world of Econs, I believe that the EMH would be true. And it would not have been possible to do research in behavioral finance without the rational model as a starting point.

...

When it comes to the EMH as a descriptive model of asset markets, my report card is mixed. Of the two components, ... I would judge the no-free-lunch component to be “mostly true.”

...

I have a much lower opinion about the price-is-right component of the EMH, and for many important questions, this is the more important component.

...

the price is often wrong, and sometimes very wrong.


Section 7 is titled "Welcome to Chicago: 1995-Present". Ha ha, another economist joke:

a Chicago economist would not bother to pick up a twenty-dollar bill on the sidewalk because if it were real, someone would already have snagged it.
Chapter 27 is titled "Law Schooling". In 1994-95, Thaler did some work applying behavioral economics to law.
By this point I had adopted the pedagogical device of calling these essential elements “the three bounds”: bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest. In law and economics these properties of Humans had heretofore been assumed to be thoroughly unbounded.
He and two lawyers published a long paper on "A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics". An interesting idea from the paper: place parking tickets on the driver's side window as a bright orange sticky note, rather then under the windshield wiper.
it might increase the perceived probability of getting a ticket, thus discouraging illegal parking at almost no cost. This example may not seem either profound or controversial, but remember that part of the received wisdom in law and economics is that people have correct beliefs, including about the probability of getting caught committing some crime, and base their decisions about whether to commit a crime, from illegal parking to robbing a bank, by calculating the expected gains and losses.
Also controversial was an experiment they had performed which did not support the Coase theorem, which states
in the absence of transaction costs, meaning that people can easily trade with one another, resources will flow to their highest-valued use.
The experiment was the one from Chapter 15, Mugs, and the "instant endowment effect" was what appeared to sink the Coase theorem.

A commentary was written by Richard Posner. Among other things, he argued that all the observed misbehaving must have come about through evolutionary biology, implying that "such behavior is good for us, in some sense, and therefore rational." Ha ha, nice handwaving!

When the paper was presented at the University of Chicago, long the center of conservative economics, it raised a furor not just for attacking rationality, but for implying support for something completely abhorrent to the libertarian view: paternalism.

The core principle underlying the Chicago School’s libertarian beliefs is consumer sovereignty: the notion that people make good choices, and certainly better choices than anyone else could make for them. By raising the specters of bounded rationality and bounded self-control, we were undercutting this principle. If people make mistakes, then it becomes conceivable, at least in principle, that someone could help them make a better choice.
Chapter 28 is titled "The Offices", and notes (not particularly economic) misbehaving in the assigning of offices in a new economics building.

Chapter 28 is titled "Football". Player selection in the NFL is used to illustrate more misbehaving. Thaler quotes Gary Becker for what Thaler calls the Becker conjecture:

“Division of labor strongly attenuates if not eliminates any effects [caused by bounded rationality.] . . . [I]t doesn’t matter if 90 percent of people can’t do the complex analysis required to calculate probabilities. The 10 percent of people who can will end up in the jobs where it’s required.”
[Man, doesn't all this stuff just seem like unbelievable handwaving at this point?]

Thaler and his grad student conducted an in-depth study of how teams pick players in the NFL draft and found serious misbehaving. And this is misbehaving by people who are presumably the tops in their field and Becker's 10%. Thaler and crew found that teams put too high a value on early picks. They should trade for multiple lower picks, this year or in the future. They give 5 reasons for this, all flavors of misbehaving.

He also looks at a decision made during football games: whether or not to go for it on 4th down. Economist David Romer crunched the numbers and concluded teams don't go for it enough. Since the paper was published, and Romer's model made available to all as the "New York Times 4th Down Bot", going for it has gone down slightly, not up! Nate Silver, noted statistician of sports and politics and editor-in-chief of 538, estimates bad 4th down decisions cost each NFL team 1/2 game per year.

Chapter 30 is titled "Game Shows". Apparently the game show "Deal or No Deal" was about as close to a perfect game "to test prospect theory and mental accounting" as is imaginable. Thaler was particularly interested in the role of "path dependence":

Does the way the game has played out influence the choices people make? Economic theory says that it shouldn’t.
Thaler finds misbehaving both when players are ahead - "playing with house money" - and behind - "trying to break even".

Next up is British show named "Golden Balls" which was based on the Prisoner's Dilemma. Cooperation was observed, but also some interesting factoids relative to how the players negotiated with each other:

  • cheap talk.” In the absence of a penalty for lying, everyone promises to be nice.
  • People are more willing to lie by omission than commission.


Section 8 is titled "Helping Out: 2004-Present".

By the mid-1990s, behavioral economists had two primary goals. The first was empirical: finding and documenting anomalies, both in individual and firm behavior and in market prices. The second was developing theory. ... But there was a third goal lurking in the background: could we use behavioral economics to make the world a better place? And could we do so without confirming the deeply held suspicions of our biggest critics: that we were closet socialists, if not communists, who wanted to replace markets with bureaucrats?
Chapter 31 is titled "Save More Tomorrow". Helping people to save for retirement seems like a great place to overcome their "bounded willpower". The (only) tool governments use to encourage saving is tax breaks. But, in some cases, lowering taxes on retirement savings, say in the case of someone who is already saving at their target rate, and does not want to save more, could result in such a person saving less ?!?!? Thaler quotes economist Douglas Bernheim:
“As an economist, one cannot review the voluminous literature on taxation and saving without being somewhat humbled by the enormous difficulty of learning anything useful about even the most basic empirical questions.”
Thaler made some interesting suggestions for increasing retirement savings:
  1. allow taxpayers to use their income tax refund to make a contribution that counts on the return currently being filed.
  2. increase withholding. People tend to save more from windfalls, and they see tax refunds as windfalls. So increase the tax refund by increasing withholding.
  3. when onboarding new employees, make signing up rather than not the default for 401(k) participation.
  4. offer employees Save More Tomorrow: sign up to automatically have your saving percentage increased for their next 4 pay raises.
The 3rd suggestion was tried, and it did improve savings greatly. The 4th suggestion was taken by 78% of employees, after 75% of them had refused an immediate savings rate increase. The misbehaving these show is improperly weighting dollars in the future lower than dollars you have right now.

When Thaler presented his results on Save More Tomorrow at the University of Chicago, he was accused of paternalism.

Normally we think that paternalism involves coercion, as when people are required to contribute to Social Security or forbidden to buy alcohol or drugs. But Save More Tomorrow is a voluntary program. I said as much and went on to say that if this is paternalism, then it must be some different variety of paternalism. Struggling for the right words, I blurted out: “Maybe we should call it, I don’t know, libertarian paternalism.”
Chapter 32 is titled "Going Public". [sarcasm]The commies show their true colors![/sarcasm] Another group publishes a paper titled "Asymmetric Paternalism", defined as:
“A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.”
Ha ha, earlier we had "anti-anti-paternalism", now the 2 above, plus 2 more, "cautious paternalism" and "optimal paternalism".
We were all trying to dig into the question that had been the elephant in the room for decades: if people make systematic mistakes, how should that affect government policy, if at all?
Thaler proposed an article and a book to his lawyer collaborator Cass Sunstein.
The premise of the article, and later the book, is that in our increasingly complicated world people cannot be expected to have the expertise to make anything close to optimal decisions in all the domains in which they are forced to choose. But we all enjoy having the right to choose for ourselves, even if we sometimes make mistakes. Are there ways to make it easier for people to make what they will deem to be good decisions, both before and after the fact, without explicitly forcing anyone to do anything? In other words, what can we achieve by limiting ourselves to libertarian paternalism?
The 1st publisher they talked to about the book suggested the word "nudge" in place of any of the various "paternalism"s above. The book "Nudge", subtitled "Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness", was published in 2008. Some examples of "nudges":
  • rumble strips on highways;
  • an etched image of a fly on near the drain of urinals to improve men's aim;
  • offering, to people choosing not to evacuate ahead of Hurricane Katrina, a marker with which to put their SSN on their body to aid in identification of victims after the storm ?!?!?
  • asking people renewing their driver's license if they want to be organ donors ("prompted choice").
Chapter 33 is titled "Nudging in the U.K.". Beginning in 2010 when Cameron became Prime Minister of the U.K., Thaler worked with several government agencies to try and implement some nudging. The 2 guidelines for implementing these nudges:
  1. If you want to encourage someone to do something, make it easy.
  2. We can’t do evidence-based policy without evidence.
The 2nd one completely concurs with my experience as a corporate manager - you can't measure progress or improvement without data. Science!

Their team - the Behavorial Insights Team or BIT - first successfully ran a campaign to get late taxpayers to pay more promptly. They then tried a campaign to get people to increase attic insulation that was not very successful.

Meanwhile, the other author of "Nudges", Cass Sunstein, took a regulatory post in the Obama administration. After 4 years he left, but then Dr. Maya Shankar succeeded creating the White House Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST). On Sept 15, 2015, Obama issued an Executive Order: Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People, calling for all government agencies to make use of the SBST.

In one final note, Thaler points that nudges can for bad as well as good, and that he always adds the phrase "nudge for good" when he signs a copy of the book.


Finally, the conclusion! Yay!

Thaler feels that behavioral economics is fairly well established, although there are, of course, still pockets of resistance.

The field appears to be converging on what I would call “evidence-based economics".

It would be natural to wonder what other kind of economics there could be, but most of economic theory is not derived from empirical observation. Instead, it is deduced from axioms of rational choice, whether or not those axioms bear any relation to what we observe in our lives every day. A theory of the behavior of Econs cannot be empirically based, because Econs do not exist.

Stimulating the economy by tax cuts is one area where we could use behavioral economics to improve outcomes. Another one is encouraging people to start businesses, i.e., become entrepreneurs. Ha ha, this is funny:
Here is one such suggestion ... offered during an impromptu television interview (so pardon the grammar):
What we need to do in this country is make it a softer cushion for failure. Because what [those on the right] say is the job creators need more tax cuts and they need a bigger payoff on the risk that they take. . . . But what about the risk of, you’re afraid to leave your job and be an entrepreneur because that’s where your health insurance is? . . . Why aren’t we able to sell this idea that you don’t have to amplify the payoff of risk to gain success in this country, you need to soften the damage of risk?
This idea did not come from an economist, not even a behavioral economist. It came from comedian Jon Stewart, the host of The Daily Show, during an interview with Austan Goolsbee, my University of Chicago colleague who served for a while as the chairman of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors. Economists should not need the host of a comedy news show to point out that finding ways to mitigate the costs of failures might be more effective at stimulating new business startups than cutting the tax rate on people earning above $250,000 a year, especially when 97% of small business owners in the U.S. earn less than that amount.
There are several examples of using behavioral economic approaches to improving aspects of our educational system.

Thaler wants all fields to be evidence-based. Who an argue with that? Science! Thaler exhorts all of us, in all fields, to observe, collect data, and speak up when you see space for improvement.

Good leaders must create environments in which employees feel that making evidence-based decisions will always be rewarded, no matter what outcome occurs.


Behavioral economics appears to me to be going strong. It's interesting that somehow "behavioral" winds up being "liberal" or progressive, and being opposed by conservative, market economists. I think Thaler gives it away when he says that they started wondering if they could use behavioral economics to "make the world a better place". Conservatives worship free markets, and those markets are clearly the only way to make the world a better place - even when they are not.

As Thaler says, they need theory. I'm not sure if it uses equations or computer simulations - I would suspect more of the latter. I think they need to integrate more evolutionary biology and psychology into their overall formulation as well. This book does make me hopeful for the future of economics as a science. Then we just have to convince conservative legislators to respect it - and the rest of science as well.

Here's a paper from 2011 on "Last-place Aversion", another flavor of misbehaving. I think this helps us to understand how the oligarchs' strategy of pitting the working class against the poor works as well as it does. Too bad it doesn't suggest a fix!


Probably an unnecessary point of clarification, but, personally, I Ain't Misbehavin'.